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FROM INCITEMENT TO INDICTMENT?
PROSECUTING IRAN'S PRESIDENT FOR
ADVOCATING ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION




Israel must be wiped off the face of the map.
-Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Let us consult yet, in this long forewhile
How to ourselves we may prevent this ill.
,-Homer
2
On October 25, 2005, at an anti-Zionism conference in Tehran, Iran's
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called for Israel to "be wiped off the
face of the map "-the first in a series of incendiary speeches arguably
advocating liquidation of the Jewish state. Certain commentators contend
that these statements constitute direct and public incitement to commit
genocide. This Article analyzes this assertion by examining the nature and
scope of recent groundbreaking developments in incitement law arising
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I See Nazila Fathi, Iran's New President Says Israel Must Be 'Wiped Off the Map,' N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at A8.
2 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK II, at 1, 256 (George Chapman trans., J.R. Smith 2d ed.
1857).
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from the Rwandan genocide prosecutions. It pieces together an analytical
framework based on principles derived from these cases, including the
Canadian Supreme Court's opinion in the Leon Mugesera matter. Using
this framework, this Article demonstrates that while a successful
prosecution would entail clearing significant substantive and procedural
hurdles, it could include both incitement and crimes against humanity
charges in light of the incitement's nexus with Iran's sponsorship of
terrorist attacks against Israel. However, the International Criminal Court
would have to put aside political pressures related to the Middle East's
toxic political environment and the absence of causation, and agree to take
the case. Given incitement law's track record to date, with prosecutions
occurring only post-genocide, the odds against such a prosecution are long.
As a result, the Article proposes that incitement law shift its focus from
punishment to deterrence. This would permit early intervention and center
incitement on its core mission of atrocity prevention. This Article also
suggests that euphemisms employed to disguise incitement, such as
"predictions" of destruction, when anchored to direct calls for violence,
should also be considered acts of direct incitement. Finally, with respect to
crimes against humanity, the Article explains that attacks on a civilian
population carried out by a proxy at the insistence of the inciter, rather
than directly by the actual inciter himself, should be sufficient to establish
liability. At the same time, in the interest of protecting free speech, the
crime should not be charged absent evidence of calls for protected-group
violence, as opposed to mere hatred.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 25, 2005, at an anti-Zionism conference in Tehran, Iran's
newly elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called for Israel to "be
wiped off the face of the map."3 That murderous exhortation turned out to
be the first in a series of provocative speeches arguably advocating
liquidation of the Jewish state.4 In the context of his nation's avowed
policy to eliminate Israel, develop a nuclear capability, 5 aid terrorist groups
3 Fathi, supra note 1.
4 See, e.g., U.N. Shocked at Iran's Israel Comment, WASH. POST, June 7, 2007, at Al
(reporting that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was "shocked and dismayed" at a report that
Iran's hard-line president said the world would soon witness the destruction of Israel); Sean
Yoong, Ahmadinejad: Destroy Israel, End Crisis, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2006, at A4.
5 See William J. Broad et al., Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Iran Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at Al; Massimo Calabresi, Iran's Nuclear Threat, TIME, Mar. 17, 2003,
at 14; Jim VandeHei, Cheney Warns of Iran as a Nuclear Threat, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2005, at A2 ("Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel ....").
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bent on destroying Israel,6 and deny the Holocaust, 7 do the Iranian
president's speeches constitute a prosecutable international crime, such as
direct and public incitement to commit genocide? Certain commentators,
including prominent figures such as Alan Dershowitz, cite to the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
8
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,9 and domestic
universal jurisdiction statutes and believe they do.' 0 In June 2007, the U.S.
House of Representatives joined the chorus by voting in support of a non-
binding resolution appealing to the United Nations Security Council to
charge Ahmadinejad with violating the Genocide Convention based on his
calls for the destruction of Israel.11 In October 2007, one of Australia's
most influential political figures, Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd,
announced that Ahmadinejad should be brought before the International
Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of incitement to genocide based on his
statements regarding Israel. 12 Rudd was subsequently elected Australian
Prime Minister, and in May of this year he announced that his government
6 Daniel Byman, Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 STUD. IN
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 169, 171 (2008) ("In addition to its support for Hizballah, Iran has
also supported a wide array of other groups that have attacked Israel.").
7 See Iranian Leader Denies Holocaust, BBC NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4527142.stm (reporting that Ahmadinejad explicitly
called the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry a "myth").
8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
10 See, e.g., Rony Blum et al., Op-Ed., Ahmadinejad: Incitement Deserves Indictment,
Jerusalem Post, Feb. 8, 2006, at 15; http://opiniojuris.org/2006/12/20/wielding-international-
law-as-a-sword-the-growing-case-for-prosecuting-ahmadinejad-for-inciting-gencide/;
DAVID MATAS ET AL., B'NAI BRITH CANADA, INDICTMENT OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD
AHMADINEJAD FOR INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE (2007), available
at http://www.bnaibrith.ca/pdf/institute/IndictmentlranianPresidentMarch07.pdf [hereinafter
B'NAI BRITH PROPOSED INDICTMENT]; Indict Ahmadinejad, Says Alan Dershowitz: Renowned
Legal Activist Addresses Packed Toronto Rally, UJA FEDERATION OF GREATER TORONTO,
Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.jewishtoronto.com/page.html?ArticlelD=139783; JUSTUS REID
WEINER ET AL., JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, REFERRAL OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT
AHMADINEJAD ON THE CHARGE OF INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE (2006), available at
http://www.jcpa.org/text/ahmadinejad-incitement.pdf [hereinafter REFERRAL OF
AHMADINEJAD].
1 See H.R. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, June 20,
2007).




was contemplating an incitement claim against Iran to be brought before the
International Court of Justice.13
And with weapons of mass destruction nearly within the Iranian
president's grasp, 14 it is increasingly urgent to inquire whether these
commentators and politicians have a point. But even if they do, could
Ahmadinejad's apocalyptic urgings realistically be prosecuted? Advocates
accurately point to relevant international and domestic legal authority
regarding incitement to genocide. A closer look, however, reveals that any
proposed prosecution of Ahmadinejad would have to clear some imposing
substantive, procedural, and political hurdles. In discussing how the
international community might bring Iran's chief executive to justice, 5 this
Article considers what those obstacles might be, and analyzes whether they
could be overcome. By the same token, it also considers whether
prosecution advocates have perhaps been too narrow in their focus on
incitement to genocide and have failed to contemplate the additional
possibility of prosecuting Ahmadinejad for crimes against humanity.
As it turns out, the Ahmadinejad case is an ideal vehicle for examining
the nature and scope of recent groundbreaking developments in incitement
law arising from the Rwandan genocide prosecutions.' 6 Culling the key
principles from these cases, this Article pieces together the emerging
analytical framework for incitement law and uses it to examine incitement
crimes in a fresh context that raises some important issues. For example,
does this developing body of law permit prosecution of a sitting head of
state whose words defy easy translation and whose audience appears
amorphous? Even if it does, would such prosecution run afoul of the law in
the absence of actual, rather than threatened,. mass atrocity? May a
politician face charges for crimes against humanity when he has supported
13 Patrick Goodenough, Indict Ahmadinejad for Inciting Genocide, CYBERCAST NEWS
SERVICE, May 19, 2008, reposted at http://www.unitedjerusalem.com/index2.asp
?id=1068957&Date=5/19/2008. It was reported that Australia is more interested in
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as opposed to the International
Criminal Court (ICC), because the structure of ICJ proceedings would permit Australia to
"have much more control over the proceedings." Id.
14 See Iranian Warns Against Added Nuclear Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2007, at
A10 (quoting Ahmadinejad as saying that it was "too late" to stop Iran's nuclear program).
15 This Article will not consider the wisdom or viability of the international community's
availing itself of non-judicial options against Ahmadinejad or Iran, including direct military
action or, apart from referral to the International Criminal Court, resort to U.N. organs such
as the Security Council, General Assembly, or Human Rights Council. However, it will not
limit itself to exploring potential criminal prosecutions exclusively as it will consider the
possibility of litigation before the International Court of Justice, a non-criminal venue.
16 See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide,
48 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 527 (2008) (noting that in examining the contours of incitement law,
"analysis of Ahmadinejad's remarks is ... instructive").
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attacks by third-party clients against civilians he is threatening in his
speeches, but has not perpetrated the attacks directly? And is there
nevertheless a risk that such charges could impermissibly infringe on
hallowed rights of free expression?
Part II of the Article details Ahmadinejad's statements and the
circumstances under which they were issued. It places these words in
context by briefly tracing the contemporary history of Iran, Ahmadiiiejad's
rise to power, and Iran's state-sponsored eliminationist rhetoric and military
policy regarding Israel. Part III considers the potential legal bases for
prosecuting Ahmadinejad and in doing so examines the state of
international incitement law from both a procedural and substantive
perspective. This entails culling a structured and integrated set of legal
principles from the emerging body of incitement law, including
jurisprudence from the Rwandan Media Case and the Canadian Supreme
Court's Mugesera decision. Part IV analyzes the viability of prosecuting
Ahmadinejad within the current form of this evolving legal matrix.
In the end, the Article concludes that, even with potential uncertainty
in the definition of the group Ahmadinejad is attacking and the audience he
is addressing, ambiguities in the translation of Ahmadinejad's words, Iran's
use of proxies to attack Israeli civilians, and the lack of an actual genocide,
it should be theoretically possible to prosecute Ahmadinejad for direct and
public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity. Any
such prosecution, however, would have to be brought before the ICC and
would require the ICC prosecutor to put aside political pressure that may
arise due to the absence of actual genocide and the toxic political
environment in the Middle East. Moreover, given the less-than-direct
nexus between the attack on civilians and the speech at issue, it would also
require a careful selection of crimes against humanity charges to avoid
undue infringement on freedom of expression.
In light of the practical unlikelihood of a prosecution despite
Ahmadinejad's extreme and extensive rhetoric, this Article proposes that
incitement law turn its focus to deterrence rather than continue its emphasis
on post-genocide prosecution. Such a prospective approach would permit
early intervention and center the crime of incitement to genocide on its core
mission of preventing atrocity. It could also lead to greater political
acceptance of prosecuting incitement at its outset, rather than punishing it
retrospectively after it has its intended effect. The Article also suggests
that, to the extent the law is not yet clear on this point, euphemisms often
employed to disguise incitement-"predictions" of destruction,
dehumanizing the target or ascribing violent motives to it, or congratulating
the audience on past acts of violence, when anchored to direct calls-should
also be considered to constitute acts of incitement. Finally, with respect to
2008]
GREGORY S. GORDON
crimes against humanity, the international community should reaffirm that
attacks on a civilian population carried out by a proxy at the insistence of
the inciter, rather than directly by the actual inciter himself, should be
sufficient to establish liability. At the same time, in the interest of
protecting free speech, the crime should not be charged absent evidence of
calls for violence against protected groups, as opposed to mere hatred.
II. IRAN, AHMADINEJAD, AND ISRAEL
A. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE RISE
OF AHMADINEJAD
With the 1979 overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini established himself as Supreme Leader of a proclaimed Islamic
theocracy in Iran. 17 The new government imposed a radical shift toward
conservatism, banning all Western cultural influences and forcing women
to return to traditional veiled dress.' 8  Khomeini spewed anti-Jewish
rhetoric that included condemnation of the state of Israel.' 9
After Khomeini's death in 1989, Islamic clerics chose Iran's outgoing
president, Ali Khamenei, to be Supreme Leader.2 ° In August of that year,
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majles (akin to a
parliament), was elected president and re-elected in June 1993.21 The
United States suspended all trade with the Islamic Republic in 1995,
accusing it of supporting terrorist groups and attempting to develop nuclear
weapons.22
In the meantime, the regime continued its harsh anti-Israel rhetoric.
On December 31, 1999, Khamenei stated that the "only possible solution"
to political unrest in the Middle East would be "the annihilation and
destruction of the Zionist state. 23  In 2000, Khamenei announced: "We
17 See Iran, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1407, 1409 (6th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/ir/Iran.html.
18 Id.
19 Mark LeVine, Why Do Some of 'Them' Hate Some of 'Us,' BELIEFNET,
http://www.beliefnet.com/story/178/story-17865_1.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2008)
("Khomeini's anti-Jewish rhetoric, grounded in negative statements about Jews in the Qur'an
that were carried over into Islamic theology, found a wide audience among Iranians .... );
Amir Taheri, Iran's New Israel Rage, N.Y. POST, Oct. 28, 2005 ("Hostility to Israel has been
a key ingredient of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy since its inception in 1979.").
20 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN
(Oct. 2006), http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/i/74169.htm.
21 Id.
22 See Iran, supra note 17.
23 Israel's Destruction Way to End Mideast Strife, Leader Exhorts, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1,
2000 at C10.
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have repeatedly said that this cancerous tumor of a state [Israel] should be
removed from the region .... President Rafsanjani stated in 2002:
If one day.., the world of Islam comes to possess... [nuclear] weapons-on that
day [Israel's] method of global arrogance would come to a dead end. This ... is
because the use of a nuclear bomb in Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas
it will only damage the world of Islam."
25
Rafsanjani acted on his anti-Semitic rhetoric when he ordered the 1994
bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed eighty-
five people. In 2006, Argentina issued an indictment against him for his
actions.26
In 1997, Iranians elected as president Mohammad Khatami, a
moderately liberal Muslim cleric, hoping he would usher in greater
freedoms and reform.27 Nevertheless, even Khatami, a relative moderate,
called Israel a "racist, terrorist state. 28 In 2004, after flawed parliamentary
elections in which many reformists were barred from contesting their seats,
a very conservative group retook control.29  This set the stage for the
ascendancy of a new force in Iranian politics: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
B. MAHMOUD AHMAD1NEJAD
1. Background
Born the son of a poor blacksmith in 1956, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
strong religious beliefs surfaced early. 30  He is reported to have had an
interest in and talent for the Qur'an as a very small child.31 He eventually
24 Iran Leader Urges Destruction of 'Cancerous' Israel, CNN.COM, Dec. 15, 2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/12/15/mideast.iran.reut/.
25 Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a Nuclear Bomb Against Israel, 325
SPECIAL DISPATCH SERIES (Middle East Media Research Inst., Jan. 3, 2002),
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=iran&ID=SP32502.
26 Oscar Serrat, Iranian Ex-Leader Sought in Argentina, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at
A19.
27 Id.
28 Michael Theodoulou, Jews in Iran Describe a Life of Freedom Despite Anti-Israel
Actions by Tehran, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR (Boston), Feb. 3, 1998, at 7, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/02/03/intl/intl.3.html.
29 BACKGROUND NOTE: IRAN, supra note 20.
30 Robert Tait, Humbling Beginning That Shaped Iran's New Hard Man: Ahmadinejad
Has Tasted the Poverty He Wants to Eradicate, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 2, 2005, at 15.
31 Id. Ahmadinejad appears to be highly intelligent and has compiled a distinguished
academic record. In 1976, he took Iran's national university entrance exams, konkoor, to
gain admission into Iran's top universities. See Iran's President Launches Weblog, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4790005.stm. His test score
ranked him 132nd among over 400,000 participants that year, landing him at the prestigious
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became a committed Islamic revolutionary activist both in and outside of
Iran.
32
Various primary sources present differing accounts regarding
Ahmadinejad's role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In 1979, he was a
member of the Office of Strengthening Unity, the student organization that
planned the Teheran American Embassy takeover.33 Six former American
hostages who saw Ahmadinejad in a 1979 photo or on television said they
thought he was among the captors who held them for 444 days, and one
said he was interrogated by Ahmadinejad.34 Ahmadinejad has denied being
one of the hostage takers and several known hostage-takers, now his strong
political opponents, deny he was with them.35
Ahmadinejad joined the Revolutionary Guards in 1986 after
volunteering to serve in the war against Iraq. 36 Later, he co-founded the
Islamic Society of Students and was an instructor for the Basij, the youth
volunteer organization that enforces the Islamic Republic's strict religious
mores.
37
Despite his penchant for revolutionary activity, Ahmadinejad was
mostly an unknown figure in Iranian politics until his May 3, 2003, election
as Mayor of Teheran.38 While in office, Ahmadinejad reversed many of the
changes put into effect by previous moderate and reformist mayors. For
example, he emphasized religion in cultural centers and required separate
elevators for men and women in the municipality offices.39
In 2005, Ahmadinejad ran for the presidency.40 He "campaigned as a
'man of the people,' .. . who live[d] in modest circumstances, .. . would
Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST) as an undergraduate student of Civil
Engineering. Id. After the Revolution, Ahmadinejad entered the Master of Science program
for Civil Engineering in 1984. See Bio: Mahmoud A hmadinejad, JERUSALEM POST, May 16,
2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=I 145961353570&pagename=JPost
/JPArticle/ShowFull. In 1989, he became a member of the Science faculty at the university
where he had studied. Id. In 1997, he received his Ph.D. in transportation engineering and
planning from lUST. Id.
32 Tait, supra note 30.
33 Bio: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 Id. A different set of accusations has been leveled against Ahmadinejad in Austria.
The newspaper Der Standard quoted a top official in Austria's Green Party as saying
authorities have "very convincing" evidence linking Ahmadinejad to the 1989 Vienna
murder of Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou, an Iranian opposition Kurdish leader. Id. Exiled
Iranian dissidents have made the same accusations. Id.
36 Id.
37 Robert Tait, Pious, Populist... Presidential?, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 25, 2005, at 17.
38 Bio: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, supra note 31.
39 Id.
40 Karl Vick, Hard-Line Figure in Iran Runoff, WASH. POST, June 19, 2005, at AO1.
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promote the interests of the poor, and [would] return government to the
principles of the Islamic revolution during the time of Ayatollah
Khomeini.""' His strategy worked, and Ahmadinejad became the sixth
President of Iran on August 6, 2005.42
After his election, Ahmadinejad proclaimed: "'Thanks to the blood of
the martyrs, a new Islamic revolution has arisen and the Islamic revolution
of 1384 [the Iranian year at that time] will, if God wills, cut off the roots of
injustice in the world."' 3  He said that "'[t]he wave of the Islamic
revolution [would] soon reach the entire world.'"44
Once in power, Ahmadinejad ratcheted up Iran's anti-Israel policy
through eliminationist rhetoric and sponsorship of attacks against Israel
through Islamist terrorist groups Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. For
example, soon after Ahmadinejad assumed the Iranian presidency, Iran
conducted a military parade during which Shahab-3 missiles (which have a
range of 1,300 kilometers-enough to hit Israel) went past the presidential
viewing platform.45 Certain missiles were draped with banners proclaiming
"Israel should be wiped off the map" and "Death to Israel. 46
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has noted that Iran has
become a "central banker for terrorism., 47 Ahmadinejad's sponsorship of
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad accounts for much of this activity.
Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shi'a Islamic political and paramilitary organization,
follows a distinct version of Islamist Shi'a ideology developed by the
Ayatollah Khomeini.48 Iran founded Hezbollah, and nurtured it early on by
helping to unite various Shiite factions behind the movement and by
providing it with training, money, and ideological support.49
41 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND
POLICY RESPONSES, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4 (2006), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67845.pdf.
42 Iran Hardliner Hails Poll Victory, BBC NEWS, June 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.cd.uk
/2/hi/middleeast/4622501 .stm.
4' Ramita Navai, President Invokes New Islamic Wave, TIMES (London), June 30, 2005,
at 37.
44Id.
45 Iran Parades Missiles, Missilethreat.com, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.missile
threat.com/archives/id. 1892/detail.asp.
46 Id.
47 See Council on Foreign Relations, State Sponsors: Iran, July 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/.
48 Frontline World, Lebanon: Party of God (May 2003), http://www.pbs.org
/frontlineworld/stories/lebanon/thestory.html.
49 See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2003); Daniel
Byman, Strange Bedfellows: What's Behind the Enduring Alliance Between Syria and Iran,
SLATE, July 19, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2146139/.
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Under Ahmadinejad, Iran financed, armed, and encouraged Hezbollah
to attack Israel in the summer of 2006. 50 The conflict began when
Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets and mortars at civilians in Israeli border
villages, diverting attention from another Hezbollah unit that crossed into
Israel, killed three Israeli soldiers, and took two others hostage. 51 Israeli
troops attempted to rescue the soldiers, but were unsuccessful, with five
Israeli soldiers killed in the attempt.52 Another five soldiers and five
civilians were wounded in the attacks.5 3 During the conflict, which lasted
until the middle of August, Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets
into Israel and an estimated twenty-three percent of these rockets hit
primarily civilian areas. 54  On the one-year anniversary of the conflict,
Ahmadinejad reportedly sent a greeting card to Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah, calling him "a soldier in the messiah's army" and proclaiming
that "the wonderful victory of the Lebanese people over the Zionist
occupiers is a result of faith, unity and resistance. '5 5 In March 2008, a
Hezbollah terrorist cell infiltrated a Jewish seminary in Jerusalem and
murdered eight religious students.56
Ahmadinejad has also provided financial support and military training
to Hamas, 57 a Palestinian Sunni Islamist group whose avowed aim is the
destruction of Israel. 58 Hamas has carried out dozens of suicide bombings
against Israel, killing large numbers of Israeli citizens. 59 Ahmadinejad has
50 See Donna Abu-Nasr, Syria, Iran Seen as Forces behind Abduction of Two Israeli
Soldiers, STARTRIBUNE.COM (Minneapolis-St. Paul), July 14, 2006,
http://www.startribune.com/140/story/552647.html; Editorial, Iran's Trap for Israel,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 13, 2006, at A8; State Sponsors. Iran, supra note 47.




54 Mideast War by the Numbers, SFGATE, Aug. 17, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/08/17/international/i 120620D58.DTL&type--tech.
55 Yoav Stem, Ahmadinejad Nasrallah Is a Soldier in the Messiah's Army, HA'ARETZ,
July 30, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/887433.html.
56 Ben Wedeman et al., Sources: Israel Attack Linked to Hezbollah, CNN.COM, Mar. 7,
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/07/mideast/.
57 Hamas Gets $50 M Boost from Iran, CBS NEWS, Apr. 16, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/16/world/main 1501210.shtml; Palestinian
Intelligence Chief Accuses Iran of Training, Funding Hamas Militants, YNETNEWS.COM,
June 24, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3416783,00.html.
58 See Greg Myre, Israeli Official Says Hamas Has Made Abbas Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2006, at A7 ("The Hamas Charter calls for Israel to be destroyed ....").
59 Id. See also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Suicide Bombers Commit Crimes
Against Humanity (Nov. 1, 2002), http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/isrl-pall01.htm
(noting that Palestinian suicide bombers have killed hundreds of Israeli citizens and injured
thousands); Greg Myre, Suicide Bombing in Israel Kills 9; Hamas Approves, N.Y. TIMES,
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furnished the same kind of support to Islamic Jihad,60 another Palestinian
terrorist organization that seeks the destruction of Israel. 1  Islamic Jihad
claimed responsibility for six suicide bombing attacks against civilians
inside Israel during 2005 and 2006.62 These attacks killed twenty civilians
and wounded scores of others, some critically. 63 Islamic Jihad has also
boasted of carrying out rocket attacks against Israeli towns, which wounded
civilian adults and children.64
All the while, Iran has come perilously close to developing a nuclear
weapons capacity. It has passed one of the most significant hurdles by
converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas.65 It is now making
strides at the next advanced stage of development, spinning the gas through
thousands of centrifuges installed at a secretly built underground
enrichment plant in Natanz, south of Tehran.66 As a result, certain experts
now believe the Islamic Republic may be capable of building an atomic
bomb by as early as 2009.67 Based on this estimation, on July 31, 2006, the
U.N. Security Council-including Russia and China-ordered Iran to stop
its enrichment program.68 Iran thumbed its nose at the Security Council,
which followed up with three resolutions, in December 2006, March 2007,
and March 2008, repeating its demands and applying sanctions.69 The
European Union has imposed its own sanctions, "target[ing] loans to
companies trading with Iran and allow[ing] for tougher cargo inspections"
of Iranian imports and exports. 70 As of this writing, Iran continues to
ignore these resolutions and "[t]he centrifuges spin defiantly on.,
7 1
April 18, 2006, at Al (quoting a Hamas spokesman as stating that a suicide bombing carried
out by the Islamic Jihad faction was "a legitimate response to ... Israeli aggression.").
60 See State Sponsors: Iran, supra note 47.
61 INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFO. CTR. AT THE CTR. FOR SPECIAL STUDIES, PROFILE
OF THE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD, PERPETRATOR OF A SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACK IN TEL
Aviv, FEBRUARY 25, 2005, (2005), available at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il
/malammultimedia/html/final/eng/sib/305/pji.htm.
62 Occupied Palestinian Territories: Islamic Jihad Must End Attacks on Civilians, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, Feb. 3, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/03/isrlpal2605_txt.htm.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See Nuclear Proliferation: The Riddle ofran, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2007, at 58.
66 id.
67 Id.
68 Id. See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (July 31, 2006).
69 See S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
70 E.U. Expands Iran Nuclear Sanctions, B.B.C. NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/7549879.stm.
71 Nuclear Proliferation: The Riddle of Iran, supra note 65.
2008]
GREGORY S. GORDON
Although a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated last year
that Iran technically halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003,72 the
country has apparently only suspended attempts to construct a warhead.
This is seemingly the easiest and quickest step in creating nuclear
weapons.73 According to Henry Kissinger and other experts, though, this
may be less important than Tehran's accelerated production of fissile
material and success at increasing the range of its missiles, much more
difficult hurdles to overcome in the nuclear weapon production process.
74
Iran's vast oil reserves, its defiant, longstanding clandestine nuclear
activity, and its parading Shahab-3 missiles-capable of hitting Tel Aviv
and festooned with words such as "Death to Israel"-suggest less than
irenic motives.75 Consistent with this, at the end of January 2008, all six
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council agreed to introduce a new
resolution likely to tighten sanctions against Iran to persuade it once again
to abandon its nuclear program.7 6 The following month, the U.N.'s nuclear
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, released a report
calling weaponization "the one major ... unsolved issue relevant to the
nature of Iran's nuclear program. ' '77  On the heels of this, the Security
Council adopted its latest sanctions resolution.78
2. Incendiary Statements
Against this ominous backdrop, Ahmadinejad has been making a
series of extremely hostile, inflammatory public comments about Israel,
Jews, and the Holocaust. Those statements may be divided into seven
72 See Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Intelligence Finding Says Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms
Efforts in 2003, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at Al.
73 See Henry A. Kissinger, Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking
Don't Mix, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2007, at A35.
74 Id. See also Valerie Lincey & Gary Milhollin, In Iran We Trust?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2007, at A41 (noting that Iran halted only its "secret enrichment and weapon design efforts,"
but "has continued other work, crucial to the ability to make a bomb, that it can pass off as
having civilian applications.").
75 Id. ("Iran is also building a heavy water reactor... [which] is ideal for producing
plutonium for reactor fuel .... And why, by the way, does Iran even want a nuclear energy
program, when it is sitting on an enormous pool of oil that is now skyrocketing in value?
And why is Iran developing long-range Shahab missiles, which make no military sense
without nuclear warheads to put on them?").
76 Christian Retzlaff & Kim Murphy, Six-Nation Pact Takes Aim at Iran, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2008, at 3, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
iran23jan23,1,6146892.story?track=rss.
77 Veronika Oleksyn, U.S.: IAEA Report Raises Questions on Iran, SFGATE, Feb. 28,
2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2008/O2/28/intemational/ii184009
S69.DTL.
78 See S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 69.
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categories: (1) calling for Israel's destruction; (2) predicting Israel's
destruction; (3) dehumanizing Israeli Jews; (4) accusing Israel of
perpetrating mass murder; (5) condoning past violence against Israel and
issuing threats against those who would protect Israel; (6) advocating
expulsion of Israeli Jews from the Middle East; and (7) denying the
Holocaust.79
a. Calls for Destruction
Ahmadinejad has publicly called for the annihilation of the state of
Israel on several occasions. In addition to his October 25, 2005, "wipe off
the map" speech, he has stated that the "'Zionist regime ... cannot
survive,"' 80 and "[cannot] continue its existence., 81 On August 4, 2006,
during the Israel-Hezbollah military conflict, he stated that the "real cure for
the [Lebanon] conflict is elimination of the Zionist regime., 82 In February
2008, he focused his eliminationist invective specifically on Israeli Jews
when he told the French newspaper Le Monde that "these false people,
these fabricated people [the Israeli people] cannot continue to exist ....
b. Predictions of Destruction
Ahmadinejad has also publicly predicted the imminent destruction of
the Jewish state on numerous occasions. During the infamous "wipe off the
map" speech, he also announced that "the growing turmoil in the Islamic
world would in no time wipe Israel away., 84 He subsequently stated at
public appearances over the next two years that the "Zionist regime" is
"heading toward annihilation" and "elimination," 85 and will "soon be wiped
79 In her thoughtful article on defining incitement, Professor Susan Benesch identifies
many of these direct and indirect speech "techniques" as "hallmarks of incitement to
genocide ...." Benesch, supra note 16, at 503.
80 Iran President's Statements on Israel, EUR. JEWISH PRESS, Dec. 10, 2006,
http://ejpress.org/article/news/1 2146.
81 Israel's Jews Should Go Home: Ahmadinejad, EXPATICA.COM, Apr. 24, 2006,
http://www.expatica.com/de/articies/news/israels-jews-should-go-home-ahmadinejad-
2951 l.html.
82 Patrick Bishop & Sebastian Berger, "Eliminate' Israel to Solve the Crisis, Says Iranian
President, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 4, 2006, at 10.
83 Une heure avec le president iranien, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, LE MONDE, Feb. 5,
2008, http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2008/02/05/une-heure-avec-mahmoud-
ahmadinejad_1007469_3218.html (author's translation) ("Un peuple falsifi6, invent6 [le
peuple isra~lien] ne va pas durer ... ").
84 Shirzad Bozorghmehr, Iranian Leader: Wipe Out Israel, CNN.CoM, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/26/ahmadinejad/.
85 Iran: Israel Facing Annihilation, CBS NEWS, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com
/stories/2006/04/14/world/main 1499824.shtml [hereinafter Israel Facing Annihilation].
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out. ''86 He publicly warned Israeli Jews that their country "will one day
vanish," 87 "will be gone, definitely,, 88 and that "they are nearing the last
days of their lives. ' 89  Furthermore, as Israel defended itself against
Hezbollah attacks in the summer of 2006, Ahmadinejad said the Jewish
state had "pushed the button of its own destruction." 90 In January 2008, he
indicated to a television audience that Israel was "doomed."91  Most
recently, as Israel celebrated the sixth decade of its existence, Ahmadinejad
told an audience that Israel was "dying" and its sixtieth anniversary
festivities were an attempt to prevent its "annihilation.,
92
c. Dehumanization
During the same time period, Ahmadinejad attempted to dehumanize
Israelis, publicly calling their country a "blot ' 93 and a "stain. 94 Opening a
conference on supporting the Palestinians, Ahmadinejad described Israel as
"a rotten, dried tree that will be eliminated by one storm., 95
He asked an audience if Israeli Jews are human beings, and answered
his own question in the negative: "They are like cattle, nay, more
misguided. A bunch of bloodthirsty barbarians. Next to them, all the
criminals of the world seem righteous. 96 In October 2007, he told a large
86 Charge Iran with 'Incitement to Genocide,' NEWSMAX.COM, Dec. 13, 2006,
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2006/12/13/104328.shtml.
87 Ahmadinejad Says Israel 'Will One Day Vanish,' RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY,
May 11, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/6803f47f-acfb-420e-8d5b-
3faceb47a0d0.html.
88 Iran President's Statements on Israel, supra note 80.
89 Joshua Rozenberg, Four Ways to Act Against Ahmadinejad: Charging Iran's
President with Incitement to Commit Genocide Would Face World Leaders with a Range of
Options, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 15, 2007, at 26.
90 Iran Leader's Warning to Israel, BBC NEWS, July 23, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/middle east/5208052.stm.
91 Ahmadinejad Scorns U.S. and Israel, BBC News, Jan. 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/1/hi/world/middleeast/7195240.stm.
92 Ali Akbar Dareini, Iranian Leader Marks Israeli Anniversary with Menace, THE
HERALD, May 15, 2008, http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/foreign/display.var.22
72254.0.0.php#comments.
93 Iranian President Says Israel Should Be Moved to Europe, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-12-09-iran-israelx.htm [hereinafter Israel
Should Be Moved].
94 Iranian President at Tehran Conference, 1013 SPECIAL DISPATCH SERIES (Middle East
Media Research Inst., Oct. 28, 2005), http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives
&Area=sd&ID=SP 101305.
95 Israel Facing Annihilation, supra note 85.
96 Iranian President Ahmadinejad Addresses Rally & Warns the U.S. & England, 1229
SPECIAL DISPATCH SERIES (Middle East Media Research Inst., Aug. 3, 2006),
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gathering of Iranians that Israel's continued existence was an "insult to
human dignity,"97 and in January 2008, he referred to the Jewish state as
"filthy. '98 The following month, he variously described Israel to supporters
at a rally as a "filthy bacteria," a "wild beast," and a "scarecrow.
'" 99
d. Accusations of Mass Murder
Ahmadinejad has also accused Israelis of committing mass murder.
He has told audiences, for instance, that Israelis Jews have allowed
"themselves to kill the Palestinian people," 100 who "are burning in the
crimes of Zionists."'0 1 He referred to residents of the Jewish state as having
"no boundaries, limits, or taboos when it comes to killing human beings."10 2
He said at another public gathering that Israeli Jews are "fighting a 'war
against humanity."' 10 3 On October 5, 2007, Ahmadinejad marked Al-Quds
Day by declaring that Israel is committing "genocide" against the
Palestinians. 104
e. Condoning Violence and Threatening Supporters
At the same time, Ahmadinejad has publicly condoned violence
against Israelis. For example, in his October 25, 2005, speech, he
commented approvingly regarding Palestinian terrorist attacks against
Israel: "There is no doubt that the new wave of attacks in Palestine will
erase this stain [Israel] from the face of Islam."'10 5 In the same speech, he
issued threats against those who would come to Israel's aid, declaring:
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP122906 [hereinafter
Ahmadinejad Addresses Rally].
97 Mike Carney, Ahmadinejad Rails against Israel for 'Genocide' against Palestinians,
USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2007, http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2007/10/ahmadinejad-
rai.html.
98 David Blair, Cheap Attack on Israel, TELEGRAPH.Co.UK, Jan. 30, 2008,
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/foreign/davidblair/an2008/ahmadinejad-israel.htm.
99 Ahmadinejad: Israel Is Filthy Bacteria, NEWSMAX.COM, Feb. 20, 2008,
http://www.newsmax.com/insidecover/Ahmadinejad:-Israel IsFi/2008/02/20/74171 .html.
100 Israel Should Be Moved, supra note 93.
10' 152 Cong. Rec. H8675, H8713-H8714 (2006) (statement of Rep. Kirk) (presenting
and commenting upon a report of the Congressional Research Service compiling remarks
made by President Ahmadinejad).
102 Ahmadinejad Addresses Rally, supra note 96.
103 Bishop & Berger, supra note 82.
104 Carney, supra note 97.




"Anybody who recognizes Israel will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation's
1106fury.
' ' 0
f. Calling for Expulsion
Ahmadinejad has also publicly advocated for the expulsion of Israeli
Jews from the Middle East. He once exclaimed that Jews had "no roots in
Palestine" and he urged their removal to Germany or Austria. 107 On another
occasion, Ahmadinejad asked that Israeli Jews be removed to Europe, the
continental United States, Canada, or Alaska.108 He again called for their
removal to Alaska at an anti-Israel rally in October 2007.109
g. Holocaust Denial
Ahmadinejad has consistently denied the existence of the Holocaust in
public. In December 2005, he complained that some European countries
"insist" that Hitler "burned millions of Jews and put them in concentration
camps" and argued that people who doubt the Holocaust should not be
subjected to adverse treatment. 1 ' Later that month, he said: "They have
created a myth that Jews were massacred and place this above God,
religions and the prophets."' 11 At Ahmadinejad's urging, the Institute for
Political and International Studies, an arm of the Iranian Foreign Ministry,
held a two-day conference in December 2006 entitled "Review of the
Holocaust: Global Vision." Ahmadinejad addressed the conference as did
other Holocaust deniers such as former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke
and Nazi sympathizers such as French professor Robert Faurisson.112
III. PIECING TOGETHER THE FRAMEWORK: THE POTENTIAL LEGAL BASES
FOR PROSECUTION
Were the international community to consider putting Ahmadinejad in
the dock for incitement crimes, on what legal authority, if any, could it
rely? In what jurisdiction would such a crime be prosecuted? To determine
this, a review of incitement law from Nuremberg to the Rwandan genocide
106 Ahmadinejad Quotes, JERUSALEM POST ONLINE EDITION, May 16, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid = 1145961353170&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle
%2FPrinter.
107 Israel Should Be Moved, supra note 93.
108 Nahid Siamdoust, Iranian President Calls the Holocaust a 'Myth,' L.A. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2005, at 5.
109 Millions of Iranians Rally for Jerusalem Day, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-05-iranN.htm.
110 Israel Should Be Moved, supra note 93.
Siamdoust, supra note 108.
112 Charge Iran with 'Incitement to Genocide,'supra note 86.
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prosecutions is necessary. Such a review permits construction of an
analytical framework through which to examine Ahmadinejad's statements.
The three main sources of law necessary for piecing together this
framework are the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute, and domestic
universal jurisdiction statutes. The two criminal offenses that could be
charged are direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes
against humanity.1 13 Each of these sources and crimes will be considered in
turn. The Article then considers the potential judicial bodies that could
exercise jurisdiction: the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the ICC; and
municipal criminal courts.
A. POTENTIAL CRIMES
1. Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
Any prosecution of Ahmadinejad for direct and public and incitement
to commit genocide would involve interpreting both the Genocide
Convention and cases interpreting its provisions, as well as the ICC's Rome
Statute and universal jurisdiction statutes. This Section considers each of
these sources in turn.
a. The Genocide Convention
i. Overview
Through the prodding and guidance of Raphael Lemkin, a Holocaust
survivor and legal scholar who coined the term "genocide," '1 14 the United
Nations General Assembly began work on a Genocide Convention with the
passage of Resolution 96(I), which established genocide as a crime carrying
individual accountability under international law. 15 The finished product,
adopted in 1948, listed the acts that constitute genocide and then
enumerated a separate set of acts that warrant punishment. Article II of the
Convention defines genocide as a series of acts-including, for example,
killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction-
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
113 Thus far, experts and commentators have not proposed crimes against humanity as a
viable charge against Ahmadinejad. However, this Article will demonstrate that if certain
factual matters could be established, such a count could be added to the indictment.
114 See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
29, 42, 61-63 (2002).
"' G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188-89, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add. 1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
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racial, or religious group, as such. Article III then states that a number of
related acts committed in furtherance of Article II shall also be punishable.
This includes, at Article III(b), "direct and public incitement to commit
genocide."
116
As Article II 3(c) of the ICTR Statute"' essentially mirrors Article III
(b) of the Genocide Convention,1 8 the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides significant assistance
regarding the interpretation of Article 111(b). And several defendants have
been prosecuted and convicted pursuant to this section of the ICTR
Statute. 119  Of these, five cases have significantly contributed to the
development of incitement law: Prosecutor v. Akayesu; 120 Prosecutor v.
Kambanda;121 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu;122 and Prosecutor v. Nahimana,
Barayagwiza & Ngeze.1 23 Additionally, a Rwandan incitement case from
the Canadian Supreme Court, Mugesera v. Canada,124 serves as an excellent
capstone that applies and elucidates the standards established by the ICTR
precedents.
By culling the important principles from these cases, a grid of analytic
criteria emerges. To determine if an utterance constitutes incitement, the
finder of fact must consider: (1) where the utterance was issued (is it
sufficiently public?); (2) its interpretation by the audience (is it sufficiently
direct?); (3) its content (is it permissible free speech or criminal
incitement?); and (4) the state of mind (or mens rea) of the person uttering
the words (is there sufficient intent?).
These cases also establish important collateral principles: (a) the
official position of the speaker will not shield him from liability; (b)
employing euphemisms does not necessarily affect the directness calculus;
116 G.A. Res. 260(111), at 174, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., Part I (A/8 10).
117 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 Jan. 1994 and 31
Dec. 1994, Annex to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
118 See Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio Stations
The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapter in the International Law of Hate Speech,
45 VA. J. INT'L L. 139, 150 (2004).
119 See REFERRAL OF AHMADINEJAD, supra note 10, at 29 (indicating that nine men have
thus far been convicted for incitement at the ICTR). This Article will describe the most
significant and relevant ICTR incitement cases.
120 Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998).
121 Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 4, 1998).
122 Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 10 (June 1, 2000).
123 Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
124 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.).
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and (c) whether the incitement leads to actual violence is of no moment-
causation is not an element of the crime of incitement.
ii. The Akayesu Case: The Mens Rea, Direct, and Public Elements
The ICTR's earliest jurisprudence established the initial foundation of
incitement's analytic matrix-the mens rea, "direct," and "public"
elements. On September 2, 1998, the ICTR (Tribunal) handed down the
world's first conviction for genocide after trial before an international court.
In finding Taba Commune mayor Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty, the Tribunal
laid the initial groundwork for interpreting the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. 125  More specifically, the Tribunal's
decision was particularly useful in shedding light on the mens rea, "direct,"
and "public" elements of the crime.
The incitement charge against Akayesu stemmed from his address to a
public gathering in Taba on April 19, 1994. He called on town residents to
unite so they could eliminate what he described as the sole enemy: the
accomplices of the "Inkotanyi"--a derogatory reference to Tutsis.126 This
was understood as an exhortation to murder Tutsis in general, 127 and Tutsis
were in fact massacred in Taba soon after the speech.
128
In its opinion finding Akayesu guilty, the Tribunal fleshed out three
important aspects of the crime: (1) mens rea; (2) the "public" element; and
(3) the "direct" element. 129 With respect to mens rea, the Tribunal held that
the requisite mental state lies in the intent directly to prompt or provoke
another to commit genocide. The person who incites others to commit
genocide must himself have the specific intent to commit genocide, namely,
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group. 30 Based on the circumstances surrounding Akayesu's conduct, the
Tribunal found he had the necessary mens rea.131 Additionally, Akayesu's
incitement was "public" because it constituted "a call for criminal action to
a number of individuals in a public place" or to "members of the general




129 The Tribunal also addressed the issue of causation-whether Akayesu's incitement
caused the massacres that followed. However, the Tribunal's holding was vague; it held that
causation was not an element of the crime, but analyzed whether causation was present





public at large by such means as the mass media, for example, radio or
television.' 32
Finally, the Tribunal held that the "direct" element of incitement
should be viewed "in the light of its cultural and linguistic content."'
33
Thus, while a particular speech may be perceived as "direct" in one country,
it would not be considered as such in another country. 34 So it would be
necessary to conduct a case-by-case factual inquiry to determine "whether
the persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the
implication thereof.'
135
The Tribunal considered both expert and fact witness testimony in
conducting this inquiry. In particular, it evaluated the testimony of Dr.
Mathias Ruzindana, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Rwanda.1
36
In his speech, Akayesu urged his listeners to kill the "Inkotanyi." Dr.
Ruzindana examined several Rwandan publications and broadcasts by
RTLM (Radio T6l6vision Libre des Milles Collines), which encouraged the
extermination of Tutsis, and determined that, when the Taba massacres
occurred, the term Inkotanyi meant RPF sympathizer 137 or Tutsi. This
testimony, corroborated by fact witnesses who testified to their
understanding of the words, convinced the Tribunal that in the context of
the time, place, and circumstances of Akayesu's speech, Inkotanyi was
tantamount to Tutsi.1
38
iii. The Kambanda Case: State Leaders and Euphemisms
Two additional components of incitement's analytical framework, the
role of state leaders and the problem of euphemisms, were soon provided by
the ICTR. Two days after Akayesu's conviction, the ICTR made history
again by becoming the first international court to convict a head of
government for genocide and crimes against humanity. 39 Pursuant to a
guilty plea, the Tribunal convicted Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of





136 Id. TT 340, 673(iv).
137 RPF stands for the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a group of primarily Ugandan Tutsi
exiles who launched an armed invasion of Rwanda after the genocide began. Id. IT 93, 111.
Inkotanyi translates roughly as warrior. Id. 147. Inyenzi means cockroach. Id. 90.
138 Id. TT 361, 709.
139 See Jeremy Greenstock, International Human Rights and Standards, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 398, 400 (1999); Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes
Justice: External Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 37 n.40 (2002).
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incitement to commit genocide and crimes against humanity, among other
crimes. 140 Although the high level of Kambanda's government position did
not factor directly into the Tribunal's legal analysis, the decision
nevertheless established that heads of state could be convicted for
incitement crimes. The factual basis for the guilty plea to incitement arose
out of Kambanda's announcement on RTLM that the radio station should
continue to encourage the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population,
specifically stating that this radio station was "an indispensable weapon in
the fight against the enemy."
14'
Kambanda further acknowledged that during the genocide he
instigated and abetted both local government officials and members of the
population to massacre civilian Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 142 He admitted
visiting several prefectures during this time to incite and encourage the
population to kill. 43  This included congratulating the people who had
already killed.1 44 Kambanda's incitement also consisted of uttering the
following incendiary phrase, which was repeatedly broadcast: "[Y]ou refuse
to give your blood to your country and the dogs drink it for nothing."'
45
iv. The Ruggiu Case: More on the Role of Euphemisms
Less than two years later, the ICTR explored in greater depth the
important role played by euphemisms in relation to the crime of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide. On June 1, 2000, Belgian national
Georges Ruggiu pled guilty to, inter alia, one count of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide in connection with ethnic hate screeds he
broadcast against Tutsis on RTLM during the genocide. 46 In sentencing
Ruggiu, the Tribunal noted that his broadcasts, in a superficially innocuous
manner, urged the population to finish off "the 1959 revolution."' 147 In fact,
as the Tribunal explained, these were code words for incitement to massacre
the entire Tutsi population. 48 The Tribunal noted that within the context of
the 1994 civil war, the term Inyenzi, used extensively by Ruggiu, became
140 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 4,
1998).





146 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence (June 1,
2000).
147 Id. TT 44(iii), 50.
148 Id. T 44(vii).
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synonymous with the term Tutsi. Ruggiu admitted that the word Inyenzi,149
as used in the socio-political context of the time, came to designate the
Tutsis as "persons to be killed." 150  He also admitted that, as part of
encouraging "civil defense," he made public broadcasts to the population on
several occasions to "go to work." 151 Again, within the socio-political
context, the expression was understood as meaning "go kill the Tutsis and
Hutu political opponents of the interim government."' 152 Among the acts
that formed the basis of the incitement charge against Ruggiu were that he
congratulated perpetrators of massacres of Tutsis,153 and that he warned the
Hutu population to be vigilant against attacks by Tutsi infiltrators.1
54
v. The ICTR Media Case: Content and Causation
While the Akayesu, Kambanda, and Ruggiu decisions provided
important guidance regarding the interpretation and scope of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, questions remained regarding two
important elements of the crime: (1) content and (2) causation. Those
aspects of incitement were addressed by the Tribunal in its landmark
December 2003 decision in The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, the ICTR's so-
called Media Case.155 The three defendants in that case, RTLM founders
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze,
editor-in-chief of the extremist Hutu newspaper Kangura, were convicted
of, among other crimes, direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
1 56
Like RTLM, Kangura had urged Rwanda's Hutus to slaughter the Tutsi
minority.
157
One of the key questions confronting the Tribunal was whether, in
transmitting the content of the messages at issue, the defendants had
engaged in the permissible exercise of free speech or in non-protected hate
advocacy. By examining existing international law precedent, the Tribunal
discerned four criteria through which speech content regarding race or
ethnicity could be classified as either legitimate expression or criminal






155 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement
and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003).
156 See Gordon, supra note 118, at 141.
157 Id. For their crimes, Nahimana and Ngeze were sentenced to life imprisonment,
while Barayagwiza was sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment. Id. (citations omitted).
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advocacy: (1) purpose; (2) text; (3) context; and (4) the relationship
between speaker and subject. '
With respect to the purpose criterion, the Tribunal furnished some
examples of legitimate endeavors: historical research, dissemination of
news and information, and public accountability of government
authorities. 59 At the other end of the gamut, explicit calls for violence
would evince a clearly illegitimate objective.
The Tribunal indicated the text criterion, for its part, would help
further reveal the purpose of the speech. To illustrate, the Tribunal
referenced Robert Faurisson v. France.160 In that case, the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (HRC) had to reconcile Article 19 of the
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), protecting
freedom of expression, with Article 20, forbidding incitement to national,
racial, or religious discrimination.161 Faurisson's Complaint had challenged
his French conviction for publishing his view doubting the existence of gas
chambers at Nazi concentration camps (he referred to them as "magic gas
chambers" in the Complaint).' 62  The Tribunal focused on the HRC's
conclusion that the term magic gas chamber suggested the author was
motivated by anti-Semitism rather than the pursuit of historical truth.1
63
The Tribunal contrasted this result with that reached in Jersild v. Denmark,
a case decided under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
which overturned the incitement conviction of a journalist who interviewed
members of a racist group but did not condemn them.' 64 The interviewer in
Jersild, noted the Tribunal, distanced himself from a message of ethnic
158 The first two criteria, purpose and text, are lumped together by the Tribunal, but I
have argued elsewhere that they should be considered separately. See id. at 172. Moreover,
the Tribunal did not explicitly characterize as a separate criterion the relationship between
the speaker and the subject. I have also demonstrated that this should be considered as a
distinct point of analysis given a close reading of the Nahimana judgment. See id. at 173-74;
see also Robert H. Snyder, "Disillusioned Words Like Bullets Bark": Incitement to
Genocide, Music, and the Trial of Simon Bikindi, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 645, 666
(2007) (adopting this analysis). But see Benesch, supra note 16, at 489 n. 17 (contending that
the Tribunal was not precise in its formulation of the test and finding it deficient).
159 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1000-06.
160 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 550/1993:




163 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1001.
164 Jersild v. Denmark, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1994). The ECHR has developed
jurisprudence balancing the right to freedom of expression, Article 10(1) of the Convention
with the right to restrict expression for national security or protection of the rights and
reputations of others, Article 10(2) of the Convention. See Gordon, supra note 118, at 146.
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hatred by referring to his interviewees as "racist" and "extremist youths.,
165
According to the Tribunal, this textual analysis allowed the Jersild court to
conclude that the purpose of the program was news dissemination, rather
than the propagation of racist views. 
166
For the "context" criterion, the Tribunal stressed that circumstances
external to and surrounding the text must be considered to grasp the text's
significance. Once again, the Tribunal looked to the Faurisson case, where
the HRC observed that, in context, challenging the well-documented
historical existence of Holocaust gas chambers would promote anti-
Semitism. The Tribunal also considered the case of Zana v. Turkey.
167
There, the ECHR considered, in the context of violent clashes between
government and Kurdish separatist forces, a former regional mayor's
statement seemingly condoning Kurdish massacres by saying "anyone can
make mistakes."'' 68 The Tribunal reasoned that the ECHR had upheld the
underlying conviction because, given the massacres taking place at the time,
the statement was "likely to exacerbate an already explosive
situation .... ,,169 The Tribunal further fleshed out the context criterion by
indicating the fact finder should consider the tone of the speaker in uttering
the words at issue.
17 0
Finally, the Tribunal indicated the fact-finder ought to scrutinize the
relationship between the speaker and the subject.'17  The analysis should be
more speech-protective when the speaker is part of a minority criticizing
either the government or the country's majority population.
172
165 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 9 993, 1001.
166 id.
167 Zana v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 667, 670 (1997).
168 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1001.
169 Id.
170 Id. 1022. Some commentators have criticized the ICTR's analysis because it looked
to international law on discrimination and hate speech for guidance. See, e.g., Benesch,
supra note 16, at 515 (complaining that the ICTR "mixed legal standards"). However, as
suggested by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in the Media Case decision, such a general
reference point is not entirely unreasonable: "In most cases, direct and public incitement to
commit genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech [but indicating they are
ultimately different]." See Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, 692. Still, the Appeals
Chamber noted that it could not conclude that the Trial Chamber referred to this
jurisprudence to "defin[e]" direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Id. 693.
171 Id. 1006.
172 Id. According to the Tribunal:
The dangers of censorship have often been associated in particular with the suppression of
political or other minorities, or opposition to the government. The special protections developed
by the jurisprudence for speech of this kind, in international law and more particularly in the
American legal tradition of free speech, recognize the power dynamic inherent in the
circumstances that make minority groups and political opposition vulnerable to the exercise of
power by the majority or by the government .... The special protections for this kind of speech
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Applying these analytic criteria enabled the Tribunal to "distinguish
between permissible speech and illegal incitement in the cases of Kangura
and RTLM."' 173 In particular, "[t]he Tribunal noted.., that some of the
articles and broadcasts offered into evidence... conveyed historical
information, political analysis, or advocacy of ethnic consciousness
regarding the inequitable distribution of privilege [between Hutus and
Tutsis] in Rwanda."'
174
For example, the Tribunal discussed a December 1993 broadcast made
by Barayagwiza in which he alluded to the discrimination he experienced as
a Hub child.175 Employing the Tribunal's diagnostic elements, the purpose
of the discourse seemed to be promotion of ethnic consciousness. The text
itself consisted of words that alluded to historical inequities but did not call
for violence. Further, the context then was not that of fully-realized
genocide, as would be the case after April 6, 1994, but rather social
volatility and political discord. 76  Finally, the speaker depicted his
experience as a member of the politically dispossessed condemning the
establishment of that era. In distinguishing Barayagwiza's transmission as
an acceptable instance of free speech, the Tribunal characterized it as "a
moving personal account of his experience of discrimination as a Hutu."' 
77
At the other end of this spectrum was a June 4, 1994, broadcast by
Kantano Habimana urging listeners to exterminate the "Inkotanyi," or
Tutsis, who would be known by height and physical appearance.
17
8
Habimana concluded: "Just look at his small nose and then break it.,,
179
The purpose and text of this broadcast readily reveal illicit advocacy of
ethnic violence. The speaker belonged to the majority ethnic group,
backing government policies, and attacking the minority. In addition, the
context at issue was one of an ongoing genocide. Finally, regarding the
should accordingly be adapted, in the Chamber's view, so that ethnically specific expression
would be more rather than less carefully scrutinized to ensure that minorities without equal
means of defence are not endangered.
Id. 712. See also Gordon, supra note 118, at 173-74.
173 Gordon, supra note 118, at 174.
174 id.
175 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 368.
176 But see Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.), 148
(finding sufficient ethnic violence during this period to satisfy the requirement for a
"widespread and systematic attack" against the Tutsis for purposes of crimes against
humanity).





relationship between the speaker and the subject, the broadcaster "in no way
attempted to distance himself from his message.,
180
Causation was the other important aspect of incitement addressed in
the Nahimana judgment. Did the crime of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide require a showing of violence occasioned by the
incitement? The Tribunal's answer was no. "The Chamber notes that this
causal relationship is not requisite to a finding of incitement. It is the
potential of the communication to cause genocide that makes it
incitement."
' 181
vi. The Mugesera Case: Putting All the Elements Together
The Nahimana case was soon followed by another significant
incitement decision related to the Rwandan Genocide, Mugesera v. Canada,
issued on June 28, 2005.182 The Mugesera decision's main significance lay
in taking all the strands of analysis from the ICTR incitement cases, re-
"' Id. 1024. See also Gordon, supra note 118, at 175-76.
181 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, 1015. On November 28, 2007, the ICTR
Appeals Chamber issued its decision in the Media Case and left undisturbed those portions
of the judgment analyzing the elements of direct and public incitement to genocide. See
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, 695 (Nov. 28,
2007) ("The Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber did not alter the constituent
elements of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide in the media
context (which would have constituted an error)."); id. 696 ("Furthermore, the Appeals
Chamber notes that several extracts from the [Trial Chamber] Judgement demonstrate that
the Trial Chamber" did a good job of distinguishing "between hate speech and direct and
public incitement to commit genocide ... "); id. 697 ("The Appeals Chamber will now
turn to the Appellants' submissions that the Trial Chamber erred (1) in considering that a
speech in ambiguous terms, open to a variety of interpretations, can constitute direct
incitement to commit genocide, and (2) in relying on the presumed intent of the author of the
speech, on its potential dangers, and on the author's political and community affiliation, in
order to determine whether it was of a criminal nature. The Appellants' position is in effect
that incitement to commit genocide is direct only when it is explicit and that under no
circumstances can the Chamber consider contextual elements in determining whether a
speech constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide. For the reasons given below, the
Appeals Chamber considers this approach overly restrictive."). Although the Appeals
Chamber found that, based on the evidence, certain pre-genocide speech could not be
considered incitement beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., id. 740-51, and that the pre-
1994 conduct of the defendants, which the Trial Chamber considered part of the incitement
crimes at issue, was outside the ICTR's temporal jurisdiction--and this resulted in a
reduction of the defendants' respective sentences, see, e.g., id. 314--the elements of
incitement and their analysis, as set forth by the Trial Chamber, were upheld. Professor
Susan Benesch states that the Appeals Chamber "rebuked" the Trial Chamber for "not
drawing a clear line between hate speech and incitement to genocide." See Benesch, supra
note 16, at 489. As indicated clearly by 696, however, her statement is simply not
supported by the actual text of the decision.
182 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.).
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examining them, and then weaving them into an integrated conceptual
fabric.
Leon Mugesera was Vice President of the Gisenyi Province branch of
the governing Rwandan hard-line Hutu MRND party.' 83  In November
1992, in the midst of the ethnic unrest that would eventually result in
genocide, 184 Mugesera delivered an infamous speech, widely interpreted by
Rwandans at the time as advocating the massacre of Rwanda's Tutsis.
185
The following are relevant portions of that speech, delivered to
approximately 1,000 people at a political meeting in Kabaya, in Gisenyi
Province:
You know there are "Inyenzis" [cockroaches] in the country who have taken the
opportunity of sending their children to the front, to go and help the
"Inkotanyis..... Why do they not arrest these parents who have sent away their
children and why do they not exterminate them? Why do they not arrest the people
taking them away and why do they not exterminate all of them? .... [We] must do
something ourselves to exterminate this rabble .... I asked if he had not heard of the
story of the Falashas, who returned home to Israel from Ethiopia? He replied that he
knew nothing about it! ... "I am telling you that your home is in Ethiopia, that we
will send you by the Nyabarongo so you can get there quickly".... Another important
point is that we must all rise, we must rise as one man ... if anyone touches one of
ours, he must find nowhere to go.186
Within a few days, Rwandan authorities issued the equivalent of an
arrest warrant, based on the content of the speech, against Mugesera, who
soon fled to Canada. 187 By 1995, however, the Canadian government had
become aware of Mugesera's background and his November 1992 speech,
and it sought to remove him from the country as having entered illegally,
due to his human rights violations and misrepresentations. 188  The
allegations against Mugesera included incitement to genocide.189
After nine years of wending its way through a multi-layered appeals
process, the Canadian Supreme Court finally upheld a 1996 lower court
decision finding that Mugesera should be deported. 190 In the process, the
183 See Joseph Rikhof, Hate Speech and International Criminal Law: The Mugesera
Decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1121, 1121-22 (2005).
184 Id.
185 Id.
16 Mugesera, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 app. III, 15-29.
187 Id. 3; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 171-72
(1995).
188 Rikhof, supra note 183, at 1123.
189 Id. The allegations were fivefold: (1) "counseling" to commit murder; (2) advocating
or promoting genocide (equivalent to incitement to genocide); (3) public incitement of
hatred; (4) committing a crime against humanity; and (5) misrepresenting his background




Court had occasion to analyze the elements of incitement to genocide.
Canada's domestic law criminalizing genocide was modeled directly after
Article II of the Genocide Convention. As a result, the opinion relied on
international law to interpret the requirements for incitement to genocide. 
91
With respect to the mens rea, and the direct and public aspects of the
crime, the Supreme Court was largely in accord with the Akayesu and
Nahimana decisions. 192 In order for a speech to constitute direct incitement,
the Court held, the words used must be clear enough to be immediately
understood by the intended audience, in light of the speech's cultural and
linguistic content.' 93 The guilty mind must contain two levels of intent: (1)
the intent directly to prompt or provoke another to commit genocide; and
(2) the specific intent to commit genocide.
94
The Court instructed that intent can be inferred from the
circumstances.195 Thus, for example, genocidal intent of a particular act can
be inferred from: (1) the systematic perpetration of other culpable acts
against the group; (2) the scale of any atrocities that are committed and their
general nature in a region or a country; or (3) the fact that victims are
deliberately and systematically targeted on account of their membership in a
particular group while the members of other groups are left alone.
96
Moreover, the Court emphasized that a speech given in the context of a
genocidal environment will have a heightened impact, and for this reason
the circumstances under which a statement is made can be an indicator of
the speaker's intent.' 97
In Mugesera's case, the Court found the allegation of incitement to the
crime of genocide to be well founded. 198 The Court provided a detailed
analysis. First, Mugesera's message was delivered in a public place at a
public meeting and would have been clearly understood by the audience.'
99
The individual to whom Mugesera was speaking in his speech (where he
referred to the "Falashas") was a Tutsi. 00 He referred specifically to the
events of 1959 when many Tutsi were massacred or went into exile, and he
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mentioned Ethiopia. 20 1 It is common lore in Rwanda that the Tutsis
originated in Ethiopia. This belief was even taught in public schools.20 2
Moreover, based on his reference to the "Nyabarongo River," the
Court found that Mugesera was suggesting that Tutsi corpses be sent back
to Ethiopia.2 3 Mugesera argued that he was only telling his audience that,
just as the Falasha had left Ethiopia to return to Israel, their place of origin,
so should the Tutsis return to Ethiopia.20 4 In their case, the return trip
would be by way of the Nyabarongo River, which runs through Rwanda
toward Ethiopia.205 This river is not navigable, however, so the return could
not be by boat. In earlier massacres, Tutsi bodies had been thrown into the
Nyabarongo.20 6
The Court also found significant the reference to the year "1959"
because the group that was exiled then was essentially Tutsi. The Court
found that the speech clearly advocated that these "invaders" and
"accomplices" should not be allowed to "get out," suggesting that the
mistake made in 1959 was to drive the Tutsi out of Rwanda, instead of
killing them, with the result that they were now attacking the country.207 In
this context, it was clear that Mugesera was recounting a discussion he
supposedly had with a Tutsi and that when he said "we will send you down
the Nyabarongo," you meant the Tutsi and we meant the Hutu.2 8 Finally,
although it was not equally clear to the Court that Mugesera was suggesting
that Tutsi corpses be sent back to Ethiopia via the Nyabarongo River, the
content of the rest of the speech, and the context in which it was delivered,
demonstrated a call for mass murder of Rwanda's Tutsis.2 °9
The Court therefore concluded that the overall message satisfied both
the "public" criterion as it was delivered in a public place at a public
meeting and the "direct" criterion since, based on Rwandan language,
history, and culture, it would have been clearly understood by the audience
as advocating the genocide of the Tutsis.210
The Court also ruled that Mugesera had the requisite mental intent. It
reasoned that since he knew approximately 2,000 Tutsis had been killed













intended specifically to provoke Hutu citizens to act violently against Tutsi
* 211citizens.
The Court also considered causation. Given the absence of proof that
the speech directly resulted in ethnic massacres, and in light of the large gap
in time between the speech and the Rwandan genocide, causation would be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove.2 12 Significantly, the Court found that
the prosecution need not establish a direct causal link between the speech
and any acts of murder or violence.213 Because of its inchoate nature,
incitement is punishable by virtue of the criminal act alone-irrespective of
the result. 214 In fact, per the Court, the government is not even required to
prove that genocide actually took place.215
b. The Rome Statute
Through Articles 6, setting forth the general crime of genocide, and
25, laying out specific instances of genocide, the Rome Statute of the ICC,
consistent with the Genocide Convention and the Statutes for the ICTR
216
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY),217 criminalizes direct and public incitement to commit genocide.218
Rome Statute Articles 6 and 25 contain language identical to Genocide
Convention Articles 2 and 3,219 and ICTR and ICTY Statute Articles 2 and
4, respectively.220 The ICC provisions have yet to be litigated, but would
presumably be interpreted consistent with the precedents analyzed above.
c. Universal Jurisdiction Statutes
Certain crimes so shock the conscience of humanity that they violate
jus cogens norms and states have an obligation to prosecute them regardless
of where they are committed.221 Genocide is one of those crimes.222 From
211 Id.
212 See Rikhof, supra note 183, at 1125.
213 Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 85.
214 Id.
215 Id. 84.
216 ICTR Statute, supra note 117, art. 2.
217 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
218 Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 6 & 25.
219 Genocide Convention, supra note 8, arts. II & III.
220 Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 6 & 25.
221 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio
Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996). The term jus cogens means the
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a procedural perspective, the notion of "universal jurisdiction" permits any
state to prosecute jus cogens offenses, even when the prosecuting State, or
"the forum state," has no link to the alleged perpetrator, his victims, or the
actual crime, pursuant to the obligatio erga omnes.
223
Amnesty International reports that approximately 125 states have
legislation of varying degrees of effectiveness and scope permitting the
exercise of universal jurisdiction over crimes.224 A number of states,
including State Parties to the Genocide Convention such as Belgium,
225
Canada,226 Germany,227 and Israel,22 8 expressly provide for universal
jurisdiction over genocide.
Moreover, domestic courts have already prosecuted perpetrators of
genocide under doctrines of universal jurisdiction.229 Adolf Eichmann was
famously convicted in Israel in 1961, inter alia, of "Crimes against the
Jewish People," essentially equivalent to genocide, for his role as chief of
compelling law, and, as such, a jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical position
among all other norms and principles. Id. at 67. As a consequence of that standing, jus
cogens norms are deemed to be "peremptory" and non-derogable. Id. Jus cogens refers to
the legal status that certain international crimes reach, and the term obligatio erga omnes
pertains to the legal implications arising out of a certain crime's characterization as jus
cogens. The term erga omnes means "flowing to all," and so obligations deriving from jus
cogens are presumably erga omnes. Id. Essentially, these terms are two sides of the same
conceptual coin.
222 See Bassiouni, supra note 221, at 68. Experts consider the following international
crimes to bejus cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy,
slavery and slave-related practices, and torture. Id.
223 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with
Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L. J. 1057, 1059 (2004).
224 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE DUTY OF STATES TO ENACT
AND IMPLEMENT LEGISLATION (2001), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset
/lOR53/002/2001/en/dom-IOR530022001 en.pdf.
225 Criminal Code of 1867 (Code Penal), art. 136 bis, available at http://www.juridat.be
/cgijloi/legislation.pl (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
226 See Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C., ch. 24(8) (2000),
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-45.9///en?page=l (last visited Aug.
15, 2008).
227 See German Code of Crimes Against International Law [CCAIL],
Vdlkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB) v. 30.6.2002 (BGBI. I S.2254) (2002), available at
www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/VoeStGB.pdf.
228 See Israeli Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, Israeli Law No.
5710-1950, available at http://preventgenocide.org/il/lawl950.htm (last visited Aug. 15,
2008) [hereinafter Israeli Genocide Law].
229 See generally William A. Schabas, National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute
Genocide, the 'Crime of Crimes,' 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 39 (2003).
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operations in the deportation of Jews to extermination camps. 23  Bosnian
Serb Nikolai Jorgic was convicted in Germany in 1997 of genocide for his
activities in Bosnia, and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Dfisseldorf
High Court.231  D~sir6 Munyaneza is currently on trial in Canada for
genocide related to 1994 mass killings of Tutsis in Rwanda.232
2. Crimes Against Humanity
Ahmadinejad's incitement might also be prosecuted as a crime against
humanity under the ICC's Rome Statute and pursuant to universal
jurisdiction statutes. This section examines each of those sources, and
scrutinizes related case law giving rise to an additional grid of analytic
criteria.
a. The Rome Statute
Article 7 of the Rome Statute states, in pertinent part, that:
For the purpose of this Statute, 'crime against humanity' means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: ... (h) Persecution
against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious... or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with anY act referred to in this
Y233paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court ....
As a threshold matter, a case of crimes against humanity against
Ahmadinejad would have to satisfy the crime's "chapeau" or threshold
elements. In other words, a court would have to find that Ahmadinejad's
advocacy against Israel was "part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.,
234
The chapeau also requires that the offenses flow from "a State or
organizational policy.
'2 35
Guidance regarding the interpretation of these chapeau elements can
be found in the ICTR incitement jurisprudence, as the ICTR crimes against
humanity provision, Article 3, contains many of the same elements as
230 See Ralph Ruebner, The Evolving Nature of the Crime of Genocide, 38 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 1227, 1228 (2005) ("[The Genocide] Convention's definition of genocide
corresponded to the Crimes against the Jewish People.").
231 Public Prosecutor v. Jorgic, Oberlandesgericht Disseldorf (Sept. 26, 1997). See also
Schabas, supra note 229, at 57 n.91.
232 See Those Who Died Quickly Were Luckiest: Witness, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Apr. 11,
2007, at A5.
233 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7.
234 Id. art. 7(1).
235 Id. art. 7(2).
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Article 7 of the Rome Statute. As discussed above and again in this
context, there are important ICTR decisions, in the Ruggiu and Nahimana
cases, that have significantly contributed to the development of this area of
incitement law. Additional insight is gained by examining the Mugesera
judgment as well as the judgments of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the cases
of Nazi media figures Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche.
By distilling the important principles from these cases, an additional
grid of analytic criteria emerges. To determine if an utterance constitutes
crimes against humanity (persecution), the finder of fact must consider: (1)
whether the speaker has discriminatory .intent and is aware that his
statements are part of a widespread and systematic attack (the mens rea
element); (21 whether the statements constitute a gross or blatant denial of a
fundamental right (the persecution element); and (3) whether the statements
are based on certain discriminatory grounds, such as ethnicity or political
affiliation (the discrimination element).
These cases from the Nuremberg Tribunal, ICTR, and Canada also
establish important collateral principles. First, statements made in the
context of sporadic ethnic violence, which are not made in strategic
coordination -with the violence, may satisfy the "widespread and systematic
attack" requirement of the crime's chapeau. Second, demonstrating a direct
causal link between the statements and violence is not necessary, as it is
sufficient to show the statements worked generally as a "poison," injected
into the polity's collective consciousness and leading to mass violence.
Finally, persecution is not a provocation to cause harm. Rather, it is the
harm itself for purposes of establishing a crime against humanity through
hate speech.
i. The Nuremberg Cases: Injecting Poison
International tribunals have found that hate speech targeting a
population on the discriminatory grounds identified in Article 7 of the
Rome Statute constitutes crimes against humanity (persecution).236
Jurisprudence to this effect finds its origins in the prosecution of Nazi war
criminals Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche by the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg.237 The IMT acquitted Fritzsche, head of the
Nazi Propaganda Ministry Radio Section during the war, for lack of
evidence of clear incitement and lack of control over formulation of
236 See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 22-23
(June 1, 2000). See also Gordon, supra note 118, at 153 n.70.
237 See IMT Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 22 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT




propaganda policy. However, it convicted Streicher of incitement as a
crime against humanity.
2 38
The conviction was based on Streicher's anti-Semitic articles in his
newspaper Der Stiirmer.239 The IMT quoted numerous instances where Der
Stiirmer called for the extermination of Jews. 240 Although Streicher denied
awareness of any Jewish massacres, the IMT found he regularly received
information on the deportation and killing of Jews in Eastern Europe.241
The judgment does not acknowledge any direct causal link between
Streicher's publication and specific acts of violence. Rather, it
characterizes his work as a poison "injected in to the minds of thousands of
Germans which caused them to follow the [Nazi] policy of Jewish
persecution and extermination. 2 42  The IMT found that "Streicher's
incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East
were being killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes
persecution on political and racial grounds in connection with War Crimes
as defined by the [IMT] Charter, and constitutes a Crime against
Humanity. 243
ii. The Ruggiu Case: Establishing the Requirements of Denial of
Fundamental Rights on Discriminatory Grounds and Awareness of the
Attack
More than fifty years after the Nuremburg judgments, the ICTR had
occasion to further elucidate the elements of incitement by holding that it
consists of the denial of fundamental rights on certain discriminatory
grounds and awareness that the charged conduct is part of a widespread and
systematic attack. In June 2000, Georges Ruggiu pled guilty to one count
of crimes against humanity (persecution), in connection with his RTLM
broadcasts. In its sentencing judgment, the Tribunal summarized the
elements that comprise persecution as follows: (1) proving those elements
required for all crimes against humanity under the Statute; (2) finding of a
gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right reaching the same level of
238 See Fritzsche Judgment, supra note 237, at 525-26; Streicher Judgment, supra note
237, at 529-30. The reasoning of the Fritzsche Judgment has been criticized as inconsistent
with the evidence and out of step with the important international criminal law principles
established by the IMT at Nuremberg. See Gordon, supra note 118, at 144 n.17.
239 See Streicher Judgment, supra note 237, at 529-30.
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gravity as the other acts prohibited under Article 5; and (3) discriminatory
grounds.244
With respect to the mens rea required for the crime, the Tribunal held:
The perpetrator must knowingly commit crimes against humanity in the sense that
he must understand the overall context of his act .... Part of what transforms an
individual's act(s) into a crime against humanity is the inclusion of the act within a
greater dimension of criminal conduct. Therefore an accused should be aware of this
greater dimension in order to be culpable thereof. Accordingly, actual or constructive
knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the accused must know
that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population and
pursuant to some kind ofpolicy or plan, is necessary to satisfy the requisite mens rea
element of the accused.
24
The Tribunal then found that Ruggiu's broadcast satisfied these
elements:
[W]hen examining the [admitted] acts of persecution.., it is possible to discern a
common element. Those acts were direct and public radio broadcasts all aimed at
singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic group ... on discriminatory grounds, by
depriving them of the fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed
by members of wider society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as
its aim the death and removal of those persons from the society in which they live
alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.
24 6
Significantly, the Tribunal noted the Streicher judgment was
particularly relevant since Ruggiu, like Streicher, infected people's minds
with ethnic hatred and persecution. 47
iii. The ICTR Media Case: No Call to Action
Over three years later, the ICTR made clear that crimes against
humanity (persecution) did not depend upon explicit calls for violence. In
December 2003, the ICTR found that the Media Case defendants were
guilty of this crime as a result of their incendiary broadcasts and writings
urging the public to murder the Tutsi minority.248 In so finding, the
Tribunal reaffirmed that hate speech targeting a population on
discriminatory group identity grounds constitutes persecution:
244 See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 21
(June 1, 2000) (citing Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16, Judgement (2000)).
245 Id. 20 (citing Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T,
Judgement (May 21, 1999)).
246 Id. 22.
247 Id. T 19.
248 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement
and Sentence, TT 1081-84 (Dec. 3, 2003).
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Hate speech is a discriminatory form of aggression that destroys the dignity of
those in the group under attack. It creates a lesser status not only in the eyes of the
group members themselves but also in the eyes of others who perceive and treat them
as less than human. The denigration of persons on the basis of their ethnic identity or
other group membership in and of itself, as well as in its other consequences, can be
an irreversible harm.
2 4 9
The Tribunal pointed out that persecution is not merely a provocation
to cause harm-it is the harm itself:
Accordingly, there need not be a call to action in communications that constitute
persecution. For the same reason, there need be no link between persecution and acts
of violence. The Chamber notes that Julius Streicher was convicted by the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg of persecution as a crime against
humanity for anti-Semitic writings that significantly predated the extermination of
Jews in the 1940s. Yet they were understood to be like a poison that infected the
minds of the German people and conditioned them to follow the lead of the National
Socialists in persecuting the Jewish people. In Rwanda, the virulent writings of
Kangura and the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM functioned in the same way,
conditioning the Hutu population and creating a climate of harm, as evidenced in part
by the extermination and genocide that followed.
2 5 0
iv. The Mugesera Case: Defining the Limits of Widespread or Systematic
Attack
Even after the Media Case trial judgment, though, questions remained
regarding the scope of a "widespread and systematic attack" within the
crimes against humanity hate speech context. Some of those questions
were answered in the Canadian Supreme Court's Mugesera decision. A
lower court had found that Mugesera's 1992 speech had not taken place in
the context of a widespread or systematic attack, since the massacres which
had occurred to that point were not part of a common plan and since there
251was no evidence that Mugesera's speech was part of an overall strategy.
As such, the lower court determined that Mugesera's speech did not
constitute a crime against humanity.
249 Id. 1072.
250 Id. 1073. This portion of the decision was upheld by the Nahimana Appeals
Chamber. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A,
988 (Nov. 28, 2007). The Appeals Chamber observed that hate speech could be considered
to be as serious as other crimes against humanity where, as in the present case, it is
accompanied by a "massive" campaign of persecution characterized by acts of violence and
destruction of property. Id. Although the appellants and the amicus curiae submitted that
hate speech which does not incite violence does not constitute persecution as a crime against
humanity, the Appeals Chamber refused to rule on this issue, leaving the question open. Id.
987. It noted, however, that the acts of persecution need not be considered individually but
should be looked at cumulatively to determine if they reach the same gravity as other crimes
against humanity. Id.
251 Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 124, 2005 SCC 40 (Can.).
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The Canadian Supreme Court rejected this analysis. It found that
Mugesera's speech occurred in a volatile situation characterized by rampant
ethnic tensions and political instability, which had already led to the
commission of massacres.252 The Court opined that a speech such as
Mugesera's, which actively encouraged ethnic hatred, murder, and
extermination, and which created in its audience a sense of imminent threat
and the need to act violently against an ethnic minority and against political
opponents, bore the hallmarks of a gross or blatant act of discrimination
equivalent in severity to the other underlying acts listed in the Canadian
253crimes against humanity statue. The criminal act requirement for
persecution was therefore met. 54
The Court also found that Mugesera's speech met the other required
elements to constitute crimes against humanity (persecution). First, the
Court held that a speech inciting hatred meets the initial criminal act
requirement for persecution as a crime against humanity when the speech
"actively encourage[s] ethnic hatred, murder and extermination" and
"create[s] in its audience a sense of imminent threat and the need to act
violently against an ethnic minority and against political opponents. 2 55 In
such circumstances, according to ICTR precedent, such speech represents
the criminal act of persecution, which is the gross or blatant denial of a
252 Id. 148. It should be noted that the Nahimana Appeals Chamber found that, for
purposes of crimes against humanity analysis, there was no "widespread or systematic
attack" against Tutsis or opposition Hums from the period January 1, 1994 through April 5,
1994-in other words, the period immediately before the outbreak of the genocide. See
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, 933. Perhaps the Appeals Chamber considered this
brief interlude as the proverbial "calm before the storm" since it recognized that Tutsis were
mass murdered during the period before 1994. Id. 931. The Appeals Chamber stated it
found insufficient support in the record for the Trial Chamber's determination (based on the
testimony of Rwanda expert Alison Des Forges) that there were "seventeen attacks" against
Tutsis between 1990 and 1993-the period during which Mugesera delivered his nefarious
oration. Id. It did not affirmatively find, however, that no such massive violence occurred
during that period. In fact, though, there is solid evidence of large-scale violence against
Tutsis in the period before and leading up to Mugesera's November 1992 speech. See, e.g.,
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Hum. Rts., Report by Special
Rapporteur, on his Mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, 27, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/7/Add. 1 (Aug. 11, 1993) (prepared by B.W. Nidaye) (reporting that between
October 1990 and January 1993, at least 2,000 civilians in Rwanda were victims of
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions).
253 Section 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985).




fundamental right on discriminatory grounds.156 The guilty mental state for
this crime is discriminatory intent to deny the right.257
Finally, the Court concluded that Mugesera targeted Tutsi and political
opponents on the sole basis of ethnicity and political affiliation with the
intent to compel his audience into action against these groups.258 He thus
possessed the requisite criminal intent for crimes against humanity
(persecution).
259
b. Universal Jurisdiction Statutes
As noted previously, crimes against humanity are among those jus
cogens crimes that give rise to universal jurisdiction.260 Many of the states
that have universal jurisdiction statutes conferring subject matter
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide also extend that jurisdiction to
crimes against humanity.261 Applying the precedents set forth above, these
states could prosecute Ahmadinejad for crimes against humanity
(persecution) in connection with his advocating the destruction of Israel.
B. POTENTIAL JURISDICTIONS
The other part of the analysis involves examining possible
jurisdictions. Prosecution advocates have suggested three procedural
avenues: (1) the ICJ; (2) the ICC; and (3) municipal criminal courts. Each
of these options shall be considered in turn.
1. The International Court of Justice
Article IX of the Genocide Convention declares that "[d]isputes
between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfillment of the present Convention... shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the
256 Id. 145.
257 Id. The Court pointed out, however, that the ICTY, in contrast, found in Prosecutor
v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 209 (Feb. 26, 2001), that the hate
speech alleged in the indictment did not constitute persecution because it did not rise to the
same level of gravity as the other enumerated acts. Mugesera, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 146.
258 Mugesera, [2005] S.C.R. 100, 149.
259 Id.
260 See Bassiouni, supra note 221, at 68. But see Jill C. Maguire, Note, Rape Under the
Alien Tort Statute in the Post-Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain Era, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 935,
968 (2006) ("Crimes against humanity are not consideredjus cogens norms.").
261 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 224, ch. 6 (noting that approximately
ninety-five states have enacted laws which would permit their courts to exercise universal
jurisdiction over persons suspected of at least some crimes against humanity, and that, for
example, Canada, Belgium, New Zealand, and Venezuela have adopted legislation expressly
providing for universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity).
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dispute. 262 Article 92 of the U.N. Charter established the ICJ, and it is the
U.N.'s primary judicial organ.263 The ICJ exercises jurisdiction solely over
claims arising between nations,264 and Article IX of the Genocide
Convention has served as the basis of ICJ litigation. In 1993, Bosnia and
Herzegovina instituted proceedings in the ICJ against Serbia and
Montenegro alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in connection
with the civil war then being fought over the break-up of the former
Yugoslavia.265
Certain commentators have urged signatories to the Genocide
Convention, such as Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom, to
file a complaint asking the ICJ for a ruling that Iran, through
Ahmadinejad's incitement, violated the Genocide Convention: "Should not
states whose citizens include Holocaust survivors, such as Canada or
Germany, be considered 'parties to the dispute?' ' 266 Such a ruling would
presumably include enjoining Ahmadinejad from committing further
incitement.267
2. The International Criminal Court
As noted above, Ahmadinejad could theoretically be prosecuted at the
ICC under the Rome Statute for committing direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, or crimes against humanity (persecution). Proceedings at
the ICC may be initiated in one of three ways: (1) a State Party may refer a
crime to the Prosecutor for investigation; (2) the Prosecutor may initiate an
investigation; and (3) the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
262 Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. 9.
263 See William L. Hurlock, The International Court of Justice: Effectively Providing a
Long Overdue Remedy for Ending State-Sponsored Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia), 12 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 299, 309 (1997).
264 See Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and
InternationalAdjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783, 802 (2004).
265 See Geoffrey S. DeWeese, Comment, The Failure of the International Court of
Justice to Effectively Enforce the Genocide Convention, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 625,
627 (1998). The ICJ found that Serbia had not committed genocide, but had violated its
duties under the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent the massacre of Bosnian males at
Srebrenica. See Alexandra Hudson, Serbia Cleared of Genocide, Failed to Stop Killing,
REUTERS FOUNDATION, Feb. 26, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk
/L26638724.htm.
266 REFERRAL OF AHMADINEJAD, supra note 10, at 34. See also Rozenberg, supra note 89
("Britain, America or pretty well any other country could request a ruling from the UN court
over whether Iran was responsible for its president's remarks and what amends the country
should make.").
267 As noted previously, Australia is currently evaluating the prospects of filing such a
case. See Goodenough, supra note 13.
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U.N. Charter, may refer a case to the Prosecutor.268 The first two ways are
based on consent. Parties consent to the jurisdiction of the ICC by either
becoming a signatory to the Rome Statute or by consenting, on a case-by-
case basis, to allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals.269
In these cases, the crimes at issue must be committed on the territory of a
State Party or by a national of a State Party.270 The Security Council may
also refer to the ICC states that are not signatories to the Rome Statute or
that have not consented to ICC jurisdiction. 7'
3. Municipal Criminal Courts
For those states that criminalize the jus cogens crimes of genocide or
crimes against humanity, regardless of the crime's location or perpetrator,
the universality principle would provide a basis for asserting jurisdiction.272
Alternative means for asserting jurisdiction might also be available.273 For
example, under the "passive personality" principle, a state may exercise
jurisdiction when one of its nationals is a victim of the alleged crime.274
This could potentially empower Israel to assert jurisdiction against
Ahmadinejad in an incitement prosecution.27 5  Other countries with
expansive anti-genocide legislation and a relatively large Jewish population,
268 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13. See also Lance Phillip Timbreza, Captain
Bridgeport and the Maze of ICC Jurisdiction, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 348, 351 (2007).
269 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 12. See also Timbreza, supra note 268, at 364.
270 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 12.
271 See Linnea D. Manashaw, Comment, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the
Distinction? A Discussion in the Context of Atrocities Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT'L
L. J. 303, 305 n.7 (2005). This was the situation in connection with the Security Council's
referral of the Darfur case to the ICC. Id.
272 Bassiouni, supra note 221, at 68.
273 The most common bases for asserting jurisdiction, the "territorial" and "nationality"
or "active personality" principles, would presumably not be available in this case. See
Matthew D. Campbell, Note, Bombs over Baghdad: Addressing Criminal Liability of a U.S.
President for Acts of War, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL L. REV. 235, 254 (2006). The "territorial
principle" permits assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant when the crime at issue is
committed on the territory of the forum state. Id. The "nationality principle" gives rise to
jurisdiction when the alleged defendant is a national of the forum state. Id.
274 See Anthony E. Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations
of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 711-12
(2007).
275 Israeli Genocide Law, supra note 228, § 5. Section 5 of this Law states: "A person
who has committed outside Israel an act which is an offence under this Law may be
prosecuted and punished in Israel as if he had committed the act in Israel." Id. Section
3(a)(2) criminalizes "incitement to genocide." Id. § 3(a)(2).
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such as Canada,276 might also consider exercising jurisdiction under this
principle.
Israel could possibly assert jurisdiction as well under the "protective
principle." Pursuant to this rule, the forum state asserts jurisdiction over
non-nationals for acts committed outside the forum state that may impinge
on its territorial integrity, security, or political independence.277 In this
case, Ahmadinejad's threats to destroy Israel, coupled with his country's
apparent efforts to develop nuclear weapons, 278 represent a credible threat to
Israel's integrity and security.
IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: ANALYZING THE VIABILITY OF
PROSECUTION
To determine whether Ahmadinejad could be prosecuted for his
violent outbursts, the substantive framework just constructed must be
applied to the Iranian president's statements. Even if this analysis suggests
that Ahmadinejad could be charged on the merits, a procedural examination
must be undertaken to see if there is a viable forum in which to prosecute
him. Thus, both substantive and procedural analyses follow.
A. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS
As indicated above, the Iranian chief executive could be charged with
direct and public incitement to commit genocide and/or crimes against
humanity (persecution). Each of these shall be considered in turn.
1. Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
In considering whether Ahmadinejad is guilty of incitement, it must
first be ascertained whether he possesses the requisite genocidal intent. If
this can be established, then the specific elements of incitement, such as its
"direct" and "public" nature, must be considered.
a. General Genocidal Intent
To review, genocide consists of certain harmful acts committed with
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group, as such. 279 As a threshold matter, would Israel or the
Jewish people of Israel, the group Ahmadinejad targets in his speeches,
276 Canada is estimated to have the world's fourth largest Jewish population. See World
Jewish Population, 2005, American Jewish Yearbook, http://www.ajcarchives.org
/AJCDATA/Files/2005_4_WJP.pdf(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
277 Giardino, supra note 274, at 711.
278 See Calabresi, supra note 5, at 33.
279 Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. 2.
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constitute a national, ethnic, or religious group? In the very document that
gave the nation its existence, Israel referred to itself as a "Jewish" state.
280
Moreover, it is generally understood that Ahmadinejad utters his harangues
in "a politically charged environment that often equates all Jews with Israel
and routinely witnesses the burning of the 'enemy' flag."28'
If he were brought to court on incitement to genocide charges,
Ahmadinejad might respond that approximately 25,000 Jews live in
Iran282 -if he meant to destroy all Jews, certainly he would kill the easily
accessible Iranian Jews first. But that argument would be unavailing. In
the first place, the Genocide Convention applies to the intent to destroy in
whole or in part a specified group.283 Thus, in Prosecutor v. Krstic, the
ICTY had to determine whether the execution by Bosnian-Serb forces of
8,000 to 10,000 military-aged Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica in July
1995, only a fraction of Bosnian Muslims in the area, constituted
genocide.284 The ICTY concluded that "the Bosnian Muslim men of
military age ... represented a sufficient part of the Bosnian Muslim group
so that the intent to destroy them qualifies as an 'intent to destroy the group
in whole or in part' ....,285 Similarly, it is likely that a court would find
that Ahmadinejad's intent to destroy the Jews of Israel, only a part of the
world's Jews, albeit a significant part, would, at a minimum, qualify as
intent to destroy the Jewish group in part for purposes of the Genocide
Convention.
Moreover, even if the prosecution could not prove that Ahmadinejad,
in desiring the destruction of Israel, had the intent to destroy a religious or
ethnic group in part, it would still have the option of proving that
Ahmadinejad aimed to destroy a "national" group. Israeli Jews, at the very
least, certainly constitute a "national" group.
286
280 See DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, May 14, 1948,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/israel/declare.htm (stating that the new nation is re-
establishing in "Eretz Israel [the 'and of Israel'] the Jewish State .... ).
281 Scott Peterson, In Ahmadinejad's Iran, Jews Still Find Space, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Boston), Apr. 27, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com
/2007/0427/pOl s03-wome.htm.
282 Id.
283 Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. II.
284 Case No. IT-98-33, Judgement, 581 (Aug. 2, 2001).
285 Id.; see also id. 598 ("[Tlhe intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military
age in Srebrenica constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within
the meaning of Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide.").
286 See Judaism 101, What Is Judaism?, http://www.jewfaq.org/judaism.htm (last visited
Aug. 15, 2008) (explaining that the "traditional explanation, and the one given in the Torah,
is that the Jews are a nation," but also noting that the Torah's translation of nation refers to a
group of people with a common history, not a political or territorial state-the definition
most commonly used today).
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Failing that, the prosecution could rely on the ICTR's holding in the
Akayesu case that, regardless of any so-called objective ethnographic or
demographic classification, Israelis would qualify as a protected group
within the meaning of the Genocide Convention if they could be considered
a "stable and permanent group. 287 The Akayesu Chamber held that there
are objective and subjective factors to evaluate in applying the "stable and
permanent group" analysis. Objectively, Israeli Jews could be considered a
"stable and permanent group" insofar as they have existed continuously for
nearly sixty years.288 Subjectively, according to the Akayesu judgment, it
would be enough that Ahmadinejad perceived the Israeli Jews as a distinct
religious, national, or ethnic group.289 In Prosecutor v. Jelisic,29 ° the ICTY
discarded the objective part of the equation and held that subjective factors
alone-particularly, the perspective of the perpetrator of the crime-should
determine group membership for purposes of finding genocide.29" The
Chamber held that a community's stigmatization of a certain group as a
distinct national, ethnic, or racial group is the dispositive factor in judging
whether the alleged perpetrators perceive the target group as such.292
Although this would be a question of fact, Ahmadinejad's derogatory rants
regarding Israelis appear to constitute strong proof of such a perception.293
b. The Elements of Direct and Public Incitement
It will be recalled that, based on existing jurisprudence, a grid of five
analytic elements must be examined to determine if Ahmadinejad has
committed the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.
These are (i) the "public" element; (ii) the "direct" element; (iii) the
"incitement" element (or speech "content"); (iv) mens rea; and (v)
causation.
i. The Public Element
The "public" element of incitement is perhaps the easiest to analyze.
The Akayesu Trial Chamber found that public incitement is characterized by
a call for criminal action to a number of persons in a public place or to
287 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, 516 (Sept. 2, 1998).
288 See Israel, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1424 (6th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.bartelby.com/65/is/Israel.html.
289 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 171.
290 Case No. IT-95-10, Judgement (Dec. 14, 1999).
291 Id. 70.
292 Id. 70-71.
293 The issue of whether Ahmadinejad's audience would perceive his statements as calls
to destroy the people of Israel will be considered, infra, in subsection IV.A.l.b.ii under the
analysis of the direct element requirement.
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members of the general public at large by such means as the mass media,
294for example, radio or television. Ahmadinejad's hate advocacy satisfies
both these tests. He uttered much of his doomsday rhetoric against Israel at
public gatherings, such as "anti-Zionism" conferences or during press
conferences. Moreover, the mass media widely disseminated his
eliminationist urgings regarding Israel (as cited throughout this Article).
ii. The Direct Element
The "direct" element of incitement would certainly be more
challenging to prove than the public element. The Akayesu Trial Chamber
held "that the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of
its cultural and linguistic content.', 295  As noted above, a case-by-case
factual inquiry is necessary. That inquiry would consist of determining
"whether the persons for whom the message was intended immediately
grasped the implication thereof.,
296
At first blush, this might not seem to present too difficult a challenge
for prosecutors. After all, Ahmadinejad stated in October 2005 that Israel
should be "wiped off the face of the map." However, a closer look reveals
three potential proof hurdles: (1) translation issues; (2) difficulties defining
the incitement's target; and (3) determining the intended audience for the
incitement.
a. Potential Translation Issues
It is generally accepted that Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be wiped
off the map. But is that really what he said? We are reading, after all, a
translation into English of something originally communicated in Farsi
(otherwise known as Persian), Ahmadinejad's mother tongue and the
primary language spoken in Iran.297 Some experts have disputed the "wipe
off the face of the map" translation.298
For example, Professor Juan Cole, a Middle East specialist at the
University of Michigan, has argued that the Iranian president was
misquoted.299 Professor Cole, a critic of the Bush Administration's Iran
policy, acknowledged that "[Ahmadinejad] did say he hoped its regime, i.e.,
294 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 556.
295 Id. 557.
296 Id. 558.
297 See Iran, supra note 17 at 1407.
298 See Ethan Bronner, Just How Far Did They Go, Those Words Against Israel?, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 4-4.
299 Id.
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a Jewish-Zionist state occupying Jerusalem, would collapse., 300 But given
that Iran has not "attacked another country aggressively for over a century,"
Professor Cole added that he smelled "the whiff of war propaganda" in the
6C 301"wipe off the face of the map" translation.
Jonathan Steele, a Middle East commentator for the U.K. newspaper
The Guardian, has likened the interpretation of Ahmadinejad's October
2005 Israel speech to that of Nikita Kruschev's "we will bury you"
comment made at a Kremlin reception for western ambassadors in 1956.302
Calling Kruschev's comment the "greatest misquotation of the cold war,"
Steele noted that "those four words were seized on by American hawks as
proof of aggressive Soviet intent." 30 3  In fact, according to Steele,
Khrushchev actually said: "'Whether you like it or not, history is on our
side. We will bury you."' 30 4 It was, Steele contends, a harmless boast
about socialism's eventual victory in the ideological competition with
capitalism. Steele insists that Khrushchev was "not talking about war.,
30 5
Steele goes on to argue that Ahmadinejad's statement was not merely
taken out of context, as Khrushchev's was, it was also mistranslated and is
now being used for propaganda purposes:
The Iranian president was quoting an ancient statement by Iran's first Islamist
leader, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, that "this regime occupying Jerusalem must
vanish from the page of time" just as the Shah's regime in Iran had vanished. He was
not making a military threat. He was calling for an end to the occupation of Jerusalem
at some point in the future. The "page of time" phrase suggests he did not expect it to
happen soon. There was no implication that either Khomeini, when he first made the
statement, or Ahmadinejad, in repeating it, felt it was imminent, or that Iran would be
involved in bringing it about. But the propaganda damage was done, and western
hawks bracket the Iranian president with Hitler as though he wants to exterminate
Jews. At the recent annual convention of the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, a powerful lobby group, huge screens switched between pictures of
Ahmadinejad making the fale "wiping off the map" statement and a ranting Hitler.
306
But there is ample evidence that the translation is accurate. Most
persuasive, perhaps, is the fact that all official translations of
Ahmadinejad's statement, including a description of it on his web site
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Jonathan Steele, If Iran Is Ready to Talk, the U.S. Must Do So Unconditionally,








(www.president.ir/eng/), refer to "wiping Israel away." 30 7  Further,
prominent Iranian translators say wipe off or wipe away is more accurate
than vanish because the Persian verb is active and transitive.3 °8
The second translation issue concerns the word map. Khomeini's
words, repeated by Ahmadinejad, were allegedly abstract: "Sahneh
roozgar." Sahneh means scene or stage, and roozgar means time. 30 9 The
phrase was consistently translated as map. Before Ahmadinejad's October
2005 speech, no one seemed to object to this translation. In his October
2005 speech, however, Ahmadinejad apparently misquoted Khomeini,
saying not "Sahneh roozgar" but "Sajheh roozgar," meaning "pages of
time" or history. No one noticed the change, though,310 and news agencies,
as well as the Iranian government, continued to use the word map.31 1
Ahmad Zeidabadi, a professor of political science in Tehran who
specializes in Iran-Israel relations, explains that map is perhaps the most
accurate rendering of the term:
It seems that in the early days of the revolution the word map was used because it
appeared to be the best meaningful translation for what he said. The words sahneh
roozgar are metaphorical and do not refer to anything specific. Maybe it was
interpreted as "book of countries," and the closest thing to that was a map. Since
then, we have often heard "Israel bayad az naghshe jographya mahv gardad"-Israel
must be wiped off the geographical map. Hard-liners have used it in their
speeches.
Yet another translation issue concerns Ahmadinejad's supposed use of
the term "occupying regime of Jerusalem" rather than plain Israel.3 3 Ethan
Bronner of the New York Times points out that, to some analysts, this means
he was calling for regime change, not war, and therefore it need not be
regarded as a call for military action.314 In support of this interpretation,
Professor Cole states: "'I am entirely aware that Ahmadinejad is hostile to
Israel. The question is whether his intentions and capabilities would lead to
a military attack, and whether therefore pre-emptive warfare is prescribed.
I am saying no, and the boring philology is part of the reason for the no. 315
However, the New York Times also notes that, to others, "occupying
regime" signals more than opposition to a certain government; but rather
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indicates "the depth of the Iranian president's rejection of a Jewish state in
the Middle East because he refuses even to utter the name Israel.
316
Ahmadinejad has said that the Palestinian issue "does not lend itself to a
partial territorial solution" and has called Israel "a stain" on Islam that must
be erased.317
Moreover, it is not as if he uttered the October 2005 pronouncement in
isolation. A review of Ahmadinejad's statements since taking the helm in
Tehran reveals other occasions where he has spoken of Israel's
destruction,3 8 and these statements have apparently not been the subject of
translation controversies.
In any event, analysis of Ahmadinejad's words entails more than mere
"boring philology." Regardless of translation, his statements must be
placed within the context of Iran's longstanding anti-Israel policy, its
support for terrorist organizations bent on annihilating the Jewish state, its
parading missiles marked with words urging Israel's liquidation, and
Ahmadinejad's refusal to acknowledge the Holocaust. A solid argument
can be made that the recipients of his messages immediately grasped the
implication of them-advocacy for the destruction of Israel.
This interpretation is consistent with the jurisprudence of the ICTR
Akayesu, Kambanda, and Nahimana precedents, as well as the Canadian
Mugesera judgment. Those cases teach that even facially ambiguous
statements can constitute "direct" incitement. Examples of such statements
include references to Inkotanyi (roughly translated as warrior), Inyenzi
(meaning cockroach),319 blood drunken by dogs, and/or members of an
ethnic group being returned to their supposed homeland using river
transportation. Given the history of Rwanda, the context of the place and
time of these pronouncements, and the evolved special meaning of the
words, incitement was established. So may it be arguably established in the
case of Ahmadinejad's statements regarding Israel.
Yet, Ahmadinejad could respond that, in each of the cited Rwandan
cases, the utterances were issued during times of violence against the
targeted group. Without specific instances of violence perpetrated directly
by Iran against Israel, his argument would go, the words uttered against the
target group in this case could not be considered sufficiently direct.
While at first blush this argument may have some traction, it is not
likely to hold up. In the first place, there is credible evidence that
Ahmadinejad supports terrorist groups attacking Israeli civilians and that
316 id.
317 id.
318 See supra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 137.
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he, therefore, has had a hand in violence against the group he is verbally
attacking. Moreover, his country is attempting to develop nuclear weapons
for the ostensible purpose of annihilating Israel. The slogans on the
Shahab-3 missiles paraded before Ahmadinejad-that Israel should be
destroyed-strongly suggest what Ahmadinejad would seek to do with the
missiles once his scientists fortify them with nuclear warheads.
Some of Ahmadinejad's other urgings, when considered within the
larger body of his statements calling for Israel's destruction, might also be
interpreted as sufficiently "direct" to qualify as incitement. Examples
including his August 1, 2006, speech equating Israeli Jews to "cattle,"
"bloodthirsty barbarians," and "criminals," and his April 14, 2006,
statement likening the Israeli nation to a "rotten, dried tree" that will soon
vanish in a "storm" had the effect of dehumanizing Israelis. In the
Rwandan context, the Kambanda judgment found comparable
dehumanization (such as the Rwandan Prime Minister's equating Tutsis to
"dogs" that were "drinking" Hutu blood) in tandem with other incendiary
pronouncements, sufficiently direct to constitute incitement.
3 21
The incitement finding in Kambanda's case was also based, in part, on
his telling Hutus that they were being attacked by Tutsis and were not
fighting back (i.e., telling Hutus that Tutsis were drinking their blood
without any repercussions).3 21  Ahmadinejad's statements indicated that
Muslims were under attack by Israel, thereby suggesting that the Islamic
world should attack Israel to stop the violence. When placed within the
framework of his other shouts for Israel's destruction, these suggestions
might be sufficiently direct to constitute incitement. For example,
Ahmadinejad exclaimed in December 2005 that Israel was "killing"
Palestinians,322 and in April 2006, he stated that the Palestinians were
"burning" as the result of Israel's crimes.323
Similarly, based on ICTR precedent, Ahmadinejad's congratulating or
condoning violence against Israelis, when anchored to his direct calls for
destruction, would seem to be direct enough to constitute incitement. The
ICTR explicitly held that Kambanda's congratulating Hutus for massacring
324Tutsis constituted incitement. This was also the case with Ruggiu's
320 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 4,
1998).
321 Id. This type of incitement is sometimes referred to as "accusation in a mirror." See
Gordon, supra note 118, at 186. Through this tactic, one imputes to "the adversary one's
own intentions and plans." Id. It is used to persuade the audience that attack by the enemy
justifies taking whatever "measures are necessary for legitimate defense." Id.
322 See supra text accompanying note 100.
323 See supra text accompanying note 101.
324 Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, 39(viii).
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congratulating Rwandan killers for slaughtering Tutsis on RTLM radio.325
Thus, Ahmadinejad's positive comments regarding Palestinian terrorist
attacks against Israel in October 2005 arguably constitute incitement.326
ICTR precedent also suggests that Ahmadinejad's "prediction"
speeches are direct enough to constitute incitement. For example, his April
14, 2006, "prediction" that the "Zionist regime" would be annihilated could
be contextually interpreted as directly calling for the destruction of the
people of Israel, as could his other predictions regarding Israel's
destruction.327 In the Nahimana judgment, for example, certain RTLM
broadcasts that predicted destruction of the "Inyenzi" were among those
emissions found to constitute incitement, including the following:
I think we are fast approaching what I would call dawn... dawn, because-for the
young people who may not know-dawn is when the day breaks. Thus when day
breaks, when that day comes, we will be heading for a brighter future, for the day
when we will be able to say 'There isn't a single Inyenzi left in the country.' The
term Inyenzi will then be forever forgotten, and disappear for good .... 328
b. Difficulties Defining the Incitement's Target
Ahmadinejad could respond that, even if he were inciting to
destruction, his incitement was direct only insofar as it targeted the "Zionist
regime" or the Israeli government, not the Jewish people of Israel
themselves. But experts note that hate rhetoric aimed at Zionism is readily
perceived as an attack on Judaism itself.329 For example, eminent historian
Yehuda Bauer, Professor of Holocaust Studies at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, has argued:
If you advocate the abolition of Israel... that means in fact that you're against the
people who live there. If you are, for example, against the existence of Malaysia, you
are anti-Malay. If you are against the existence of Israel, you are anti-Jewish.
3
0
325 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR 97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence, 50 (June 1,
2000).
326 See Bozorghmehr, supra note 84.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 85-92.
328 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement
and Sentence, 405 (Dec. 3, 2003). See also Gordon, supra note 118, at 185-87 (explaining
that "incitement can take many forms" and speech which does not explicitly order its
listeners to commit murder can nevertheless constitute incitement because, in certain
contexts, it conditions a population for genocide).
329 See, e.g., B'NAI BRITH PROPOSED INDICTMENT, supra note 10, Section ILA, 2 ("The
accused refers to Jews in his anti-Semitic statements as Zionists.").




The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights announced in 2006 that anti-
Israelism or anti-Zionism is the equivalent of anti-Semitic bigotry on
American college campuses.331 It concluded that "anti-Semitic bigotry is no
less morally deplorable when camouflaged as anti-Israelism or anti-
Zionism.,
332
And any argument that Ahmadinejad's motives in urging the
destruction of Israel are anti-Semitic is given further credence by his fervent
Holocaust denial, which many see as another form of anti-Semitism. Noted
historian Deborah Lipstadt flatly refers to Holocaust denial as "anti-Semitic
ideology., 333  Holocaust denial has also been characterized as
"manufactured myth" and a "groundless belief' that is "used to stir up Jew-
hatred. 334 This is especially true in the context of Middle Eastern politics:
"One predictable strand of... Islamic anti-Semitism is Holocaust
denial .. .
Responding to those who would note that Ahmadinejad has not
explicitly called for the murder of Israel's Jews, William Schabas notes that
"[t]he history of genocide shows that those who incite the crime speak in
euphemisms., 336 As stated bluntly by Australian Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd: "The Iranian President's... statements are ... anti-Semitic and
express[] a determination to eliminate the modern state of Israel from the
map .... ",3 In the end, any prosecution of Ahmadinejad for incitement
would certainly entail a battle of the experts (possibly including historians,
social linguists, and political scientists) regarding the translation of his
words, their contextual meaning, and his audience's interpretation of them.
c. Determining the Intended Audience for the Incitement
Audience interpretation may also be a significant issue. In particular,
any judgment of Ahmadinejad on incitement charges would have to
determine exactly what constituency or population segment was the
intended audience for his anti-Israeli outpourings. While in certain cases
331 U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RTS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE U. S. COMM'N.
ON CIv. RTS. REGARDING CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM (April 3, 2006), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/050306FRUSCCRRCAS.pdf.
332 Id.
133 DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH
AND MEMORY 1 (1993).
334 MARVIN PERRY & FREDERICK M. SCHWEITZER, ANTISEMITISM: MYTH AND HATE FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 3 (2002).
331 Id. at 10.
336 William A. Schabas, Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 529, 530 (1999). See also Benesch, supra note 16, at 506.
337 See Dareini, supra note 92.
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the speeches were made before exclusively Iranian audiences, they were
typically disseminated internationally.338 Perhaps an expert could divine
the significance of certain words heard by an Iranian audience but would
the same understanding of the words extend to an international audience?
Of what would the "international audience" consist? Could the
international audience be Muslims in general, or could it be more narrowly
categorized as extreme Islamist? Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
sees a good argument for perceiving the entire Muslim world as
Ahmadinejad's intended audience: "It's not just hyperbole from the bully
pulpit of Tehran, it's the roll-on effect across the Islamic world, particularly
those who listen to Iran for their guidance. 339
Such factual issues would have to be resolved by those who would sit
in judgment of Ahmadinejad. At the very least, it seems an analysis of the
meaning of the speeches from an Iranian perspective would have to be
conducted. Assuming the target audience is Iranian, the question arises as
to what exactly the incitement is urging the population to do. If
Ahmadinejad himself, or the Iranian government, would push the button
launching nuclear missiles against Israel, why must Iranian civilians be
persuaded to attack? The answer may lie in Ahmadinej ad's efforts to create
consensus for an Iranian policy that would result in mass murder and could
trigger a war that Iranian citizens would have to fight. The Iranian
population has expressed dissent against Ahmadinejad, and he has
attempted to quell such opposition through both rhetoric and repression.34°
Ultimately this is an issue of fact that would have to be resolved at trial.
In any event, even if Ahmadinejad could successfully argue that he has
not been advocating for the "destruction" of Israel or the "murder" of Israeli
Jews, he has indisputably urged their forced expulsion from the geographic
territory now recognized as Israel.341 It will be recalled that on December 8,
2005, Ahmadinejad called for removing Jews from Israel and forcefully
relocating them to Europe.342 One week later, he advocated ethnically or
religiously cleansing the Middle East of Israeli Jews by redistributing them
from Israel to Europe, the continental U.S., Canada, or Alaska.343
338 See supra notes 76-107.
339 Dareini, supra note 92.
340 See, e.g., Robert Tait, Students Protest Against Ahmadinejad, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec.
12, 2006, at 16, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/12
/highereducation.iran; Alireza Jafarzadeh, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Gas Rationing Causes
Riots in Iran, FOXNEwS.COM, June 29, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story
/0,2933,287424,00.html?sPage=fnc.foxfan/blogs.
341 See Israel Should Be Moved, supra note 93.
342 Id.
343 See Siamdoust, supra note 108.
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Prosecutors could argue that, at the very least, Ahmadinejad has
advocated for acts that would cause serious mental, if not bodily, harm to
Israeli Jews. Forced relocation, apart from the fact that it is typically
accompanied by other human rights abuses, results in destruction of
identity, residence, family structure, livelihood, and general physical
344protection.
For the same reasons, prosecutors may also argue that such forced
expulsion would amount to deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
In the Akayesu case, the ICTR interpreted acts constituting "conditions of
life calculated to bring about [an ethnic group's] ... physical
destruction ... [as] subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet,
systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical
services below minimum requirement.,
345
iii. The Incitement Element
As explained above, the Nahimana judgment identified four criteria to
determine whether hate speech constitutes the legitimate exercise of
freedom of expression or the commission of criminal incitement: (1)
purpose; (2) text; (3) context; and (4) the relationship between speaker and
344 See Marco Simons, The Emergence of a Norm Against Arbitrary Forced Relocation,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 95, 112 (2002).
345 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, 506 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(emphasis added). On the other hand, it is not clear that "ethnic cleansing" would
necessarily qualify as genocide. Ethnic cleansing has been defined as "rendering an area
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons
from another ethnic or religious group." See Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N.
SCOR, Annex IV, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (1994), available at
http://www.osa.ceu.hu/db/fa/304-0-1-I.htm. Professor William Schabas notes that the
drafters of the Genocide Convention proposed to add "measures intended to oblige members
of a group to abandon their homes in order to escape the threat of subsequent ill-treatment"
to the list of acts considered genocide. See William A. Schabas, Universal Jurisdiction:
Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Problems of International Codification- Were the
Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEw ENG. L. Rev. 287, 296 (2001).
Ultimately, the proposed addition resembling the crime of ethnic cleansing was not included
in the Genocide Convention's definition of genocide because of U.N. members' concerns
over already completed "forced transfers of minority groups" by the U.N. itself Id.
Nevertheless, certain commentators believe that "ethnic cleansing" fits the definition of
genocide. See, e.g., John Webb, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing-Substantive and
Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 377, 379 (1993) ("The practice of 'ethnic
cleansing,' also referred to as 'ethnic purification,' involves the elimination of rival ethnic
groups of political opposition. The practice may also constitute genocide which requires
condemnation by the international community under the Genocide Convention.") (footnote
omitted).
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subject.346 Ahmadinejad's statements regarding Israel would appear to
meet each of these criteria.
With respect to purpose, Ahmadinejad's mind-set is revealed by the
evidence just discussed-the ensemble of his remarks regarding Israel,
including those murderous words festooned to his parade missiles, his
active support of terrorist organizations devoted to eliminating Israel and
engaged in murdering Israeli civilians, and his fervent Holocaust denial.347
Furthermore, the Islamic Republic's long-standing eliminationist policy
toward Israel and its clandestine development of a nuclear weapons
capacity further reflect Ahmadinejad's objectives rather clearly.348 His
words in no way appear to be cloaked in even a nominal patina of
legitimacy, such as raising ethnic consciousness, journalistic reporting, or
detached historical exegesis.
The "wipe off the map" speech of October 2005 seems to satisfy the
text element on its face. For the reasons stated in connection with the
directness element, pronouncements dehumanizing Israeli Jews,
congratulating murderers of Israeli civilians, and predicting Israel's
destruction are also textually incriminatory. The import of the words is an
exhortation to raze the Jewish state. The Holocaust denial statements are a
closer call. While they may not be facially incriminating from an
incitement perspective, and therefore not the subject of separate counts in
an indictment, they serve as damning circumstantial evidence of the textual
and mental criminality in relation to the other chargeable statements.
The context of Ahmadinejad's statements, for the reasons stated above,
strongly supports the argument that they constitute illegal incitement, rather
than legitimate free speech. As demonstrated previously, circumstances
external to and surrounding the text of each chargeable statement clarify the
text's significance. These circumstances include overall Iranian policy
goals, the entire body of Ahmadinejad's public comments about Israel, his
support of terrorists, and his blatant Holocaust denial. Also potentially
relevant is the fact that Israeli civilians were killed by terrorist groups
supported by Ahmadinejad during the period in which Ahmadinejad was
issuing these proclamations.349
Moreover, Ahmadinejad has in no way attempted to distance himself
from the statements by attributing them to someone else, for instance, or
proposing them hypothetically for the sake of academic argument.
Additionally, the tone of the statements ought to be considered. If, from a
346 See supra text accompanying note 153.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 64-76.
349 See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
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vocal perspective, they were issued in a pitched, bellicose manner, the
argument for incitement becomes stronger. A milder academic intonation,
on the other hand, could be used by the defense to help negate this element.
With regard to the relationship between the speaker and the subject,
Ahmadinejad's rants against Israel do not seem to implicate a minority or
disenfranchised group expressing dissent related to the policies or practices
of a majority or controlling group. Ahmadinejad speaks as President of
Iran, a sovereign nation equal in status to other sovereigns in the family of
nations, including Israel.
Ahmadinejad could potentially argue that Israel is supported by the
United States, the world's only superpower and nominally an enemy of Iran
that controls Iran's actions around the world to the benefit of American and
Israeli interests. His statements, he could therefore argue, represent dissent
against the American-Israeli hegemony. But Ahmadinejad might have
difficulty convincing a court that calls for the total destruction of a nation
represent a legitimate form of dissent.
iv. The Mens Rea Element
The evidence just considered also supports a finding that Ahmadinejad
made his statements with a guilty mind. As elucidated by the Akayesu
decision, the person who incites others to commit genocide must himself
have the specific intent to commit genocide, "namely, to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.' 350 Marshaling proof
of mens rea here is intimately tangled up with establishing the directness
element and the purpose and context sub-elements under the incitement
criterion. The evidence considered herein appears rather convincing in
support of guilt but, as previously indicated, the issue would ultimately be
decided by a thorough presentation of the evidence and an attendant battle
of the experts.
v. The Causation Element
This element likely would be the proverbial "big white elephant" in the
courtroom for any prosecution of Ahmadinejad for incitement. The
Nahimana and Mugesera judgments are crystal clear that proof of causation
is not necessary to make out a case for incitement to genocide.35
This jurisprudence, however, may not be determinative. In the first
place, the ICTR and Canadian judgments, although extremely persuasive, 352
350 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, 560 (Sept. 2, 1998).
351 See supra text accompanying notes 173 and 206-08.
352 See David Marcus, The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights Through
Supranational Adjudication, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 99 (2006) ("Furthermore, the decisions
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are not binding on any court that could try Ahmadinejad.353 Moreover,
even without a formal causation requirement, no international court has
ever brought an incitement prosecution in the absence of a subsequent
genocide or other directly-related large-scale atrocity.35 4  Given
Ahmadinejad's status as head of a sizable, relatively powerful state in an
unstable region and the messy foreign policy implications of attempting to
prosecute him for genocide, odds are low any jurisdiction would go to the
trouble. Even if it did, the absence of directly-related mass murder or
widespread violence might prove fatal to any prosecution case not
otherwise bulletproof.
2. Crimes against Humanity
For prosecutors successfully to establish that Ahmadinejad's speeches
constitute crimes against humanity, they must overcome two imposing
hurdles. The first is proving that the speeches were part of a widespread
and systematic attack directed against a civilian population with
Ahmadinejad's awareness that the speeches were part of the attack. The
second is demonstrating that such charges are not unduly restrictive of free
speech.355
a. Part of a Widespread and Systematic Attack of which Ahmadinejad Was
Aware?
For Ahmadinejad's Jeremiads against Israel to constitute crimes
against humanity, his advocacy would have to be "part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack., 356  This would be a difficult obstacle for prosecutors to
overcome. Given the absence of direct Iranian attacks on Israeli civilians,
of international criminal tribunals have as close to a stare decisis effect as international law
recognizes."); Peggy E. Rancilio, From Nuremberg to Rome: Establishing an International
Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 299, 324
(2001) ("Although these decisions would not have the precedential value of stare decisis,
they would serve to create a body of jurisprudence upon which other systems could rely
when interpreting the same human rights provisions.").
353 See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1, 35 (2006) ("Stare decisis
does not formally operate in international law.").
354 See, e.g., JUSTUS REID WEINER, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, REFERRAL
OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD ON THE CHARGE OF INCITEMENT TO COMMIT
GENOCIDE, 71 (Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID
=
1565#_ftnrefl38 ("Sadly, the historical record shows that the international community has
never before prosecuted incitement until after thousands or millions were killed.").
355 See supra Part II.A.2 of this Article for analysis.
356 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 7(1).
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they would have to tie Ahmadinejad's calls for Israel's destruction to
attacks on Israeli citizens by Iran's clients-Hezbollah or Hamas/Islamic
Jihad.
While this might prove quite challenging, it is nevertheless legally
possible. International law recognizes the responsibility of sponsor states
for atrocities committed by clients in territory outside the control of the
sponsor state. For example, the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua
v. United States held that a state could incur international responsibility for
violations of international humanitarian law if it exercised "effective
control" over armed rebels fighting in another state.357 In Prosecutor v.
Tadic, the ICTY held that there was an international armed conflict, not an
internal armed conflict, in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Army of
Republika Srpska was sufficiently linked to the Federal Republic of
358Yugoslavia. In so finding, the ICTY criticized the ICJ's Nicaragua
linkage test as "at variance with international judicial and State practice"
and required a "lower degree of control" to find linkage between the
sponsor state and its client.359 Although it presents a question of fact to be
resolved at any eventual trial, it is certainly conceivable that Ahmadinejad's
support of Hezbollah and Hamas/Islamic Jihad sufficiently links him to
those organization's attacks against Israeli civilians for his "destroy Israel"
speeches to be tied to those attacks.
Moreover, "to convict an accused of crimes against humanity, it must
be proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian population
357 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 62, 64-65,
109 (June 27) (requiring a certain degree of "dependence on the one side and control on the
other"); (finding "no clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a
degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf'); id.
115 (requiring "effective control").
358 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement (July 15, 1999).
359 Id. 124. But see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 108, 390-93 (Feb.
26) (applying the Nicaragua v. United States "effective control" test, not the Tadic "overall
control" test, in finding that Serbia did not control the military and paramilitary units
responsible for genocide in Srebrenica). The ICJ's use of the "effective control" test has
been criticized. See, e.g., Ademola Abass, Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The
ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 871, 896 (2008) ("The difficulty with an indiscriminate application of
the Nicaragua control test soon emerged in Bosnia v. Serbia, where, unlike Nicaragua, the
shared objective is the commission of international crimes."). One could plausibly assume
that in genocide cases with comparable linkage issues between superior and subordinate
sovereigns, an international criminal adjudicatory body, such as the ICC, would opt to follow
the Tadic, as opposed to the Bosnia v. Serbia, precedent. Abass notes that "the jurisprudence
of other international tribunals treats the required control with some degree of flexibility."
Id. at 894.
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(occurring during an armed conflict) .... ,36 Again, this will be a question
of fact at trial but the available evidence suggests that Ahmadinejad's
"eliminate Israel" advocacy is related to the attacks on Israeli civilians
sponsored by Ahmadinejad and perpetrated by Hezbollah and Islamic
Jihad.361 The Mugesera judgment indicates, moreover, that the connection
between the incitement and the attacks on the civilian population may be
somewhat attenuated.362 In any event, the evidence underlying this issue
would have to be further developed at trial.
Based on the currently accessible evidence, perhaps the statements
most directly related to attacks are those made by Ahmadinejad during
Hezbollah's summer 2006 war against Israel. In his July 23, 2006, remarks,
for example, he exclaimed that Israel had "pushed the button of its own
destruction" and advised the Jewish state "to pack up and move out of the
region before being caught in the fire they have started in Lebanon."
363
Approximately two weeks later he declaimed: "The Zionist regime is
fraudulent and illegitimate and cannot survive. 364 The following day, his
words were even more direct. Accusing Israel of fighting a "war against
humanity," he concluded that the "real cure for the [Lebanese] conflict is
elimination of the Zionist regime. ''365 These words urge destruction and are
self-referentially tied to Hezbollah's attack on Israeli civilians.
b. Unduly Restrictive of Free Speech?
Even if viable, any charge of crimes against humanity arising from
these statements may be met with stiff resistance by free speech advocates.
There is a split between the ICTR and ICTY as to whether hate speech can
constitute persecution. In a questionable decision, a Trial Chamber of the
ICTY rejected liability for this crime in Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez,
finding that "it [did] not rise to the same level of gravity as the other acts
enumerated in [the ICTY's crimes against humanity provision, Article
5] ... and had not attained the status of customary international law."
366
360 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 271.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
363 Iran Leader's Warning to Israel, supra note 90.
364 Iran President's Statements on Israel, supra note 80.
365 Bishop & Berger, supra note 82.
366 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 209 (Feb. 26,
2001). However, the Kordic judgment did not even acknowledge the Ruggiu judgment,
which clearly held that hate speech can constitute the crime against humanity of persecution.
Moreover, it attempted to distinguish the Streicher judgment by characterizing it as an
"incitement" case. Id. at n.270. The Chamber superficially took the word incitement from
the Judgement and, citing Akayesu, apparently concluded that was the crime for which
Streicher was convicted. Id. In fact, Streicher was convicted of crimes against humanity
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They may also rely on Nazi Radio chief Hans Fritzsche's acquittal by
the Nuremberg IMT. The IMT found that Fritzsche's speeches, while
"show[ing] definite anti-Semitism... did not urge persecution or
extermination of Jews. 367  While Fritzsche "sometimes made strong
statements of a propagandistic nature in his broadcasts," the IMT was "not
prepared to hold that they were intended to incite German people to commit
atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have been a
participant in the crimes charged.,
368
Regardless of the precedential value of Kordic and Fritzsche, many
experts, particularly Americans, believe that charging defendants with this
crime entails an impermissible trampling on freedom of expression
rights.369 Joel Simon, deputy director of the Committee to Protect
Journalists, points out that many governments in Africa have "exploited the
perception that the violence in Rwanda was fueled by the media to impose
legal restrictions on the press in their own countries.,,370 Simon concludes
that "the misuse of hate-speech laws by repressive African governments
may well be a greater threat right now than hate speech itself. 3 71 Echoing
that concern, American First Amendment expert Kevin Goering has opined
that the Nahimana persecution convictions "would be considered as
attacking mere advocacy, and would not have been sustained in the United
States." '372
These experts may have a good point. Still, they appear to be more
concerned about criminalizing speech that calls for hatred towards a group
(e.g. a particular race or religion), as opposed to speech that calls for
violence against the group.373 The U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v.
(persecution). See Streicher Judgment, supra note 237, at 529-30. The Chamber tried
inartfully to duck the question but it never managed to distinguish the Streicher judgment.
The Chamber's position is further undercut by the Nahimana appeals judgment, which
upheld the Trial Chamber's finding that hate speech can constitute crimes against humanity
(persecution) in the proper circumstances. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, &
Ngeze, Case No. ICTR 99-52-A, 988 (Nov. 28, 2007). There is, in fact, a good argument
that this has ripened into a rule of customary international law.
367 Fritzsche Judgment, supra note 237, at 526. The IMT failed to explain how the
virulent Nazi anti-Semitism spewed over the airwaves by Fritzsche amounted to anything
other than persecution.
368 Id.
369 See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial:
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COP. L. 17, 46-47 (2005).
370 Joel Simon, Of Hate and Genocide: In Africa, Exploiting the Past, 44 COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. 9, 9 (2006).
371 Id.
372 Kevin W. Goering et al., Why U.S. Law Should Have Been Considered in the
Rwandan Media Convictions, 22 COMM. LAW. 10, 12 (2004).
373 Orentlicher, supra note 369, at 39.
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Ohio3 74 placed great emphasis on direct calls for violence in formulating a
test for whether hate speech would qualify for constitutional protection. It
held that the First Amendment will not protect speech that "is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such
action.,
375
Based on the analysis presented in this Article, Ahmadinejad's
"destroy Israel" speeches arguably would not qualify for Constitutional
protection under Brandenburg.376 This seems especially true in the context
of Iran's violent proxy attacks on Israel through the terrorist organizations it
supports. On the other hand, should the calls for Israel's annihilation be
actionable only if tied to Iran's nuclear strike capability, which might not
exist until 2009 at the earliest? If so, Brandenburg might imply that
Ahmadinejad's words do not call for sufficiently "imminent lawless
action." Given the enormous scale of the potential destruction, and the
comparatively slower reaction time of any potential collective global law
enforcement effort necessary to deal with the threat, perhaps Ahmadinejad's
calls for destruction are sufficiently imminent.
377
174 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
375 Id.
376 This assumes, of course, that American First Amendment standards, which are by far
the most speech protective in the world and are not in line with international law, would be
used at all. In the international context, that is not likely. As the Nahimana judgment points
out: "The Chamber considers international law, which has been well developed in the areas
of freedom from discrimination and freedom of expression, to be the point of reference for
its consideration of these issues, noting that domestic law varies widely while international
law codifies evolving universal standards." Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze,
Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, 1010 (Dec. 3, 2003).
377 In this regard, an analogy might be drawn to another area of international law. With
respect to national self-defense, customary law has traditionally recognized a limited right of
pre-emptive self-defense that implicates "imminence" pursuant to the so-called "Caroline
doctrine." In diplomatic negotiations resulting from the British burning an American ship
(the Caroline) used to supply anti-British rebels in Canada, the U.S. and Britain agreed that
permissible anticipatory self-defense meant a necessity for self-defense that was "instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" and the action
taken must not be "unreasonable or excessive." Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending
Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 213, 225 n.67 (2004). Certain
American counter-terrorism experts have attempted to redefine imminence to shift the
inquiry from timing to the probability of harm. See Jules Lobel, 9/11 Five Years on: A Look
at the Global Response to Terrorism: The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc
Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1418 (2007). In their view, the imminence standard
applied literally to a world of modem weaponry, rogue states, and terrorists "would be a
suicide pact." Id. Instead of defining imminence as the moment when a blow is just about to
land, they would define imminence in terms of the likelihood of the attack occurring. Id.
Where the magnitude of the harm is great, as in a potential terrorist nuclear attack on the
United States, they would require a lesser probability. If the Brandenburg standard were
applied here, given Ahmadinejad's doomsday calls in the context of weapons of mass
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On the other hand, any persecution charges arising from
Ahmadinejad's less incendiary statements should be scrutinized carefully to
segregate those calling for hatred from those calling for violence. Only the
latter should be prosecuted. This is extremely important in a case, such as
this one, where the nexus between attacks on the civilian population and the
speech is less direct.
B. PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Assuming prosecutors could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Ahmadinejad committed the crimes of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide and crimes against humanity, equally challenging
procedural issues could derail any potential prosecution. These procedural
issues bifurcate into two general categories: (1) immunity for Ahmadinejad
as an acting head of state; and (2) obstacles to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Ahmadinejad by the various judicial bodies that have been
proposed.
1. Immunity
Although the Kambanda judgment demonstrated that a former head of
state can be prosecuted for atrocity crimes, would the same be true of an
acting head of state, such as Ahmadinejad? Head of state immunity has
long protected state leaders and ministers from criminal prosecution for acts
performed under the cloak of state leadership, 378 and is recognized by
customary international law.379  Acting heads of state, such as
Ahmadinejad, enjoy two different types of immunity: functional and
personal.38°
"Functional immunity... attaches to the official or public nature of
the acts" performed by a state official in the exercise of her functions.38' Its
rationale is grounded in the assumption "that acts performed by [a] state
official[] are to be ascribed only to the state that [she] represent[s]. '382
"Hence, functional immunity is substantial in nature and survives the
cessation of office. 383
destruction and reliance on terrorist organizations, a similar rethinking of "imminence"
might also be in order for this case.
378 See ELLEN S. PODGOR, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 81 (2004).
379 Id.
380 See Micaela Frulli, The Question of Charles Taylor's Immunity: Still in Search of a
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Conversely, personal immunity, "enjoyed only by limited categories of
high-ranking state officials, [is] absolute because [it] attach[es] to a specific
status or position and to the important functions associated with it. 38 4 The
principle of personal immunity is:
[Essentially based on the notion of functional necessity: certain categories of state
officials (heads of state, heads of governments, foreign ministers and diplomatic
agents) need to exercise their functions without any threat, impediment or interference
in order to ensure the smooth and peaceful conduct of international relations. Though
absolute, personal immunities come to an end when the state official relinquishes her
official position ... 385
This type of immunity is "therefore [a] procedural bar[] to the exercise
of jurisdiction. 38 6  Incumbent heads of state enjoy both functional and
personal immunity; former heads of state are protected only by functional
immunity.
3 87
Despite appearing inviolable in the first part of the 20th century, head
of state immunity seemed to be eroding by century's end. Treaties, such as
the Genocide Convention, and institutions, such as the ICTR, ICTY, and
ICC, all removed immunity for heads of state and state actors accused of
atrocity crimes.3 8 In the epochal immunity decision of the British House of
Lords regarding former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet, the Law Lords
viewed waiver of immunity as an obligation that fell upon any state with
access to the perpetrator of ajus cogens crime, such as torture.389
Nevertheless, millennial reports of sovereign immunity's demise in
human rights cases were apparently premature. In Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium, the ICJ in 2002 held that Belgium's issuance of an arrest
warrant for Congo's foreign minister in a human rights criminal case
violated the sovereign immunity principle in international law. 390 The ICJ




387 Id. at 1126 n.29.
388 See Genocide Convention, supra note 8, art. 4; ICTY Statute, supra note 217, art. 7(2)
("The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as
a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment."); ICTR Statute, supra note 117, art. 6(2); Rome Statute, supra
note 9, art. 27. "Atrocity" crimes refer to the most heinous international offenses including
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. See David J. Scheffer, The Future of
Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 389, 393-402 (2002).
389 See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1333 (Lord Nichols) (1998). See also Gilbert
Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of
State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 1583, 1598 n.115 (2000).
390 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 70
(Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
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attaches to a foreign minister prohibited that state from engaging in even
the preliminary stages of investigation and prosecution for jus cogens
crimes during the foreign minister's term of office. 391 The ICJ rejected the
argument that a post-World War II customary international law exception
had developed to preclude immunity for state actors in national courts for
jus cogens crimes such as genocide.392 However, the scope of this decision
is somewhat circumscribed. While acknowledging the "irrelevance of
official capacity ... in conventional texts or in the statutes of international
criminal tribunals," it implied that "national courts should respect the
functional immunity accruing to state officials accused of the most serious
international crimes. 393
What impact, therefore, would sovereign immunity have on any
potential criminal prosecution of the incumbent Iranian president? The
answer is that it would not affect any prosecution brought before the ICC.
However, it would likely bar any municipal prosecution under a universal
jurisdiction statute. It is now necessary to consider whether such a
municipal court, or any international court, could exercise personal
jurisdiction over Ahmadinejad.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
The other procedural issue that must be considered is the extent of
personal jurisdiction that courts could exercise over Ahmadinejad. As
explained above, three judicial bodies are implicated: the ICJ, the ICC, and
municipal criminal courts.
a. The International Court of Justice
As noted previously, certain commentators have urged states such as
Israel, the United Kingdom, or the United States to file a complaint against
Iran in the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. Australia, a party to the Genocide Convention, is
currently considering a claim against Iran in the ICJ. 394  However, ICJ
jurisdiction is normally based on the consent of the parties,395 and Iran is
not likely to consent to ICJ jurisdiction in this case.
391 Id. 58.
392 Id. See also Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for
International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.
853, 868 (2002) (discussing the legal implications of the ICJ decision).
393 Frulli, supra note 380, at 1126-27.
394 See Goodenough, supra note 13.
395 See ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 127 (1996).
[Vol. 98
FROM INCITEMENT TO INDICTMENT?
Nevertheless, if a treaty includes a "compromissory clause" that
specifically includes the ICJ as an appropriate forum for dispute resolution,
the States that are parties to it may file a unilateral application to the Court,
thus making jurisdiction compulsory for respondent States.396 Many
dispute, however, whether this is actually "compulsory."
397
In 2006, the United States, not wanting interference in its death penalty
cases involving foreign nationals, withdrew from the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.398 It did so because the
Vienna Convention compromissory clause mandates ICJ jurisdiction when
foreign nationals report they have been illegally denied the right to see a
home-country diplomat when jailed abroad.399 Iran could similarly reject
the Genocide Convention's compromissory clause with few or no
consequences. It is already flouting Security Council Resolutions
demanding the closure of its nuclear program.4 °°
b. The International Criminal Court
Iran is not a signatory to the Rome Statute 40 1 and Ahmadinejad's
chargeable incitement crimes appear not to have been committed on the
territory of a signatory. Thus, the only realistic way that the ICC could
assert jurisdiction over Ahmadinejad is through Security Council referral.
402
Such a referral would indicate international acquiescence to prosecution and
would furnish the most realistic possibility, given the globally broad
consensus and Security Council support, for enforcement of ICC actions.
c. Municipal Courts
While certain domestic courts, especially Israel's, could in theory
exercise jurisdiction over Iran's leader under the theories of passive
personality, national security, or universality, the odds of enforcing the
396 Id.
397 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice: Just How Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 29, 31 (2006) ("This jurisdiction
of the Court is not really compulsory [as States] cannot be 'compelled' to enter into a treaty
in the ordinary meaning of that term, let alone to accept the jurisdiction of the Court to
resolve disputes under the treaty in question.").
398 See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases; Foes of Death Penalty Cite
Access to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A01.
399 Id.
400 See, e.g., Michael Slackman & Dan Bilefsky, Iran Says It Will Ignore U.N. Deadline
on Uranium Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at A3.
401 See Anthony Dworkin, The International Criminal Court: An End to Impunity?,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT MAG., Dec. 2003, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org
/icc magazine/icc-intro.html.
402 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13; Manashaw, supra note 271, at 305 n.7.
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exercise of such jurisdiction would be long indeed. This is not a very
realistic option. As acknowledged by prosecution advocate Justus Reid
Weiner:
While Israel and other national states may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction over
Ahmadinejad, it is unclear that they would be willing or able to do so.
Germany... might exercise the profound historical courage necessary to undertake
such a challenge. Otherwise it is doubtful that any state would be willing to accept
the political fallout of such a move.
403
C. THE F1NAL ANALYSIS
Given the available options, which of the jurisdictions and claims
discussed above would be the most viable for prosecuting Ahmadinejad?
Consider the available jurisdictions first. At the outset, two of them appear
problematic.
The ICJ would certainly allow Genocide Convention signatories to
seek a judgment as to whether Ahmadinejad's speeches amount to
genocidal incitement. But Iran would not very likely submit to the ICJ's
jurisdiction, and it is doubtful that the Genocide Convention's
compromissory clause would persuade them otherwise. Even if Iran did
acknowledge jurisdiction, what would be the value of such a judgment?
In the first place, it would take years for the ICJ to rule on the
question.40 4 By then, Iran might have already unleashed its nuclear wrath
on Israel. Even if it arrived more expeditiously, an ICJ judgment might
represent symbolic vindication but would not ultimately be enforceable. °5
Finally, the ICJ only permits complaints against states, not individuals.4 °6
But the recent trend in international law is to focus liability forjus cogens
transgressions on the individuals who commit them.40 7 In other words, the
403 Weiner, supra note 354, 86.
404 See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1327 (2004)
("[T]he ICJ process is slow and time-consuming, so that prospective power positions at the
time of filing are unlikely to remain constant through the proceedings. This means states'
initial interest in coordination may be in fact moot by the time the court produces a
decision.").
405 See Rebecca Trail, The Future of Capital Punishment in the United States: Effects of
the International Trend Towards Abolition of the Death Penalty, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 105, 121 n.130 (2002) ("The IACHR, the ECHR, and the ICJ are currently
unenforceable courts, which deliver decisions that are intended to be complied with through
an honor system.").
406 See Paulus, supra note 264, at 802.
407 See Alberto Costi, Hybrid Tribunals as a Viable Transitional Justice Mechanism to
Combat Impunity in Post-Conflict Situations, 22 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REv. 213, Part III.E
(2006) ("The emergence of a new culture of human rights and individual criminal
responsibility has heralded the principle that there can be no impunity for international
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concern is to remove the cloak of collective national guilt and focus the
world's opprobrium on the person and his individual responsibility for the
criminal acts at issue. 408  Adjudicating the world's claims against
Ahmadinejad via an action against Iran, as one large, monolithic entity,
409would contravene that purpose.
Prosecution of Ahmadinejad before a municipal criminal court might
be similarly problematic. In the first place, based on the ICJ's decision in
the Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium, sovereign immunity is most
probably a bar to any such prosecution in municipal courts against sitting
heads of state.41 0 Even were that not the case, absent military intervention,
one country's unilateral efforts to obtain custody of Ahmadinejad would
likely be futile.
So that leaves the ICC. As mentioned previously, a Security Council
referral would likely be the only realistic way of calling Ahmadinejad to
account for his crimes. Although it might seem a long shot, there is reason
to think it possible. The Security Council has recently found consensus on
the issue of Iran's nuclear program and has issued resolutions demanding an
end to it.4 11  Iran, however, has openly defied the Council. 4 12  If Iran
continues with its program and Ahmadinejad continues to incite to
genocide, the Security Council might feel more disposed to refer an
incitement case against the Iranian president to the ICC, particularly if
Australia presses ahead with an ICJ case against Iran. That might be a more
comforting initial course of action than military intervention. As observed
by noted legal expert David Matas:
The international community, when asked to intervene militarily to prevent
genocide, is immobilized. I need only refer to the ongoing genocide in Darfur,
happening while we sit here, to make my point. It should be far easier and
straightforward to prosecute for incitement to genocide. Prosecution for incitement to
genocide means enforcing obligations to which states have committed. It means
crimes."); Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing
Recognition of Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8 MICH. ST. U. DET.
C. L. J. INT'L L. 595, 602 (1999).
408 See Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 574 (2006).
409 In addition, at least one expert has noted there could be a potential issue as to whether
the Iranian state bears legal responsibility under the Genocide Convention for statements
made by its president. See Goodenough, supra note 13.
410 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 70
(Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
411 See supra notes 69-71.
412 See Riddle of Iran, supra note 65.
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resorting to legal institutions rather than using force. It means acting when there is
still time, rather than after it is too late.
413
If the Security Council did refer Ahmadinejad to the ICC, what are the
odds of a successful prosecution on the merits? With respect to incitement
to genocide, apart from disputes over the group targeted and the meaning of
specific words and translations, the most vexing issue is causation. No
prosecutor has ever brought such an incitement charge without a genocide
having already occurred. But refusal to prosecute pre-genocide effectively
eviscerates the crime's rationale. Direct and public incitement to commit
genocide is an "inchoate crime" that is, by definition, "punished before the
harm that is the ultimate concern of society occurs .... ,41 4 It is axiomatic
that an inchoate crime is committed prior to, and independently of, the
object crime. "Indeed, the main purpose of punishing inchoate crimes is to
allow the judicial system to intervene before an actor completes the object
crime. ,415
In Prosecutor v. Musema, the ICTR noted that inchoate crimes (in that
case conspiracy) are "punishable by virtue of the criminal act as such and
not as a consequence of the result of that act. 4 16 In an accompanying
footnote, the Tribunal explicitly stated that this applied to the inchoate
crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. It added that this
crime carries such a high risk for society that it must be punished without
reference to subsequent acts, if any, of genocide.417
That conclusion was echoed in both the Nahimana and Mugesera
judgments. But such pronouncements ring hollow indeed if no judicial
body is willing to apply them before the mass graves are dug.
Ahmadinejad's incendiary speeches present the world with a golden
opportunity to use the incitement charge for its intended purpose: to prevent
genocide, not merely to punish it ex post facto. After all, were humanity to
wait for Israel's nuclear annihilation, it could certainly thereafter prosecute
Ahmadinejad for genocide. At that late date, though, an incitement charge
might seem superfluous or redundant. Given the staggering loss of human
life that would have occurred, a criminal conviction would be an act of
413 DAVID MATAS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, JUSTICE FOR GENOCIDE,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/Justice for Genocide/DavidMatas/page.do?id=1051082&nl=3
&n2=35&n3=1398 (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
414 Nick Zimmerman, Attempted Stalking: An Attempt-To-Almost-Attempt-To-Act, 20 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 219, 222 (2000).
415 Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 }-IARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (1989).
416 Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, 193 (Jan. 27, 2000).
417 Id. at n.37 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgement, $ 52
(Sept. 2, 1998)).
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empty symbolic vindication but nothing more. As Hitler expert Ron
Rosenbaum explains:
It has never happened before, this kind of preemptive indictment, but that doesn't
mean it can't happen now, or that it shouldn't happen now, or that the international
law making incitement a separate crime shouldn't be applied to Ahmadinejad and his
genocidal incitement against the Jewish state .... Considering the hideous historical
record of failure in the past to prevent genocide, failure to pursue this course (in
addition to any others that may be necessary to stop or prevent genocide) would itself
be a crime.
Aside from generating legitimate concerns among defenders of free
speech, a charge of crimes against humanity (persecution) would be rather
vulnerable with respect to the chapeau element of connection to a
"widespread and systematic attack., 419 Could the prosecution prove that
Ahmadinejad's inflammatory speeches against Israel were delivered as part
of Hezbollah's widespread and systematic attack against Israeli civilians in
the summer of 2006?42o If so, would there be sufficient evidence of
coordination between Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah to prove Ahmadinejad's
knowledge of the attacks and that the crimes flowed from a State or
organizational policy? Again, while these are questions of fact, given Iran's
strong support of Hezbollah, it is not unreasonable to imagine that the
connection could be established.4 2'
Moreover, as noted above, there is legal precedent to support a
connection to widespread attacks carried out by a nominally separate
organization on foreign soil. In the context of Balkan atrocities of the
1990s: "The Bosnian War led drafters to weaken the 'state action'
requirement because the Serb militias were unofficial and only loosely
affiliated with the Yugoslav state., 422  In Ahmadinejad's case, even if
Hezbollah could only be considered "loosely affiliated" with the Iranian
state, international law suggests that its widespread murder of Jewish
civilians in the summer of 2006 could be pinned to Ahmadinejad and his
contemporaneous violent verbal campaign against Israeli Jews.423
418 Posting of Ron Rosenbaum to PAJAMAS MEDIA, Incitement Indictment: Time to Bring
Ahmadinejad to Justice, http://ronrosenbaum.pajamasmedia.com/2006/12/20/incitement-
indictmenttimeto.php (Dec. 20, 2006, 6:19 AM).
419 For analysis of "widespread and systematic attack," see supra text accompanying
notes 249-52.
420 See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
421 See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
422 David Luban, A Theory of Crimes against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 96
(2004). But see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 108, 390-93 (Feb. 26),
(applying the more rigorous "effective control" test).




The strange witch's brew of current Iranian politics includes prominent
doses of hatred for Israel and Israeli Jews, Holocaust denial, support of anti-
Israel terrorist groups, and the apparent development of nuclear weapons.
While stirring this toxic potion, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
has been chanting to his people a call for the death and destruction of the
Jewish state. Should the world wait until the Islamic Republic has operable
weapons of mass destruction before it responds to Ahmadinejad's urging to
mass murder?
This Article has demonstrated that a more viable option exists: taking
legal action against Ahmadinejad for crimes arising out of his doomsday
invective. By cobbling together the emerging pieces of incitement law, an
analytical framework emerges that suggests prosecution of the Iranian
leader would be possible. Three forums exist to take such action: the ICJ,
the ICC, and municipal courts. Two distinct crimes could be the basis of
such legal action: direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and
crimes against humanity (persecution). Prosecution before the ICC via
Security Council referral would be the most viable option and would confer
the distinct advantage of the international community's blessing.
Any successful prosecution of Ahmadinejad would require deference
to incitement precedent (not technically required in international law), a
minimal expansion of current doctrine and conventional wisdom, and
strong vigilance for freedom of expression in choosing the proper charges.
This Article has shown that such an effort would be consistent with the
trends that have given rise to incitement's developing analytical
framework.424 Still, in the current political and legal environment, the odds
of prosecution are quite long. Perhaps only when Iran gives the world
incontrovertible proof of its nuclear weapons capacity and begins training
its fortified missiles directly on Israel will the international legal
community seriously contemplate judicial action against Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. Unfortunately, that might be too late.
424 As pointed out in the Benesch article on defining incitement to genocide, and as I
have indicated here and elsewhere, the crime should be fleshed out even more systematically
than it already has been. A case against Ahmadinejad would certainly provide an
opportunity to do so. However, focusing exclusively and narrowly on the "wipe off the
map" speech, Benesch concludes that Ahmadinejad has not committed incitement to
genocide. See Benesch, supra note 16, at 490-91.
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